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Featured Article

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LYMAN TOWER SARGENT

OSCAR WILDE put the theme of this essay rather well: "A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realization of utopias" (27). But today the word "progress" bothers us, so, perhaps William Morris had John Ball say it better—"But while I pondered all these things, and how men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant under another name. . . (46)."[1] The story of these dreams, their temporary successes and failures, and their continuing resurrection, reconstitution, and renewal is my subject.

The story can be read as tragedy or farce, but it can also be read, and this is my intention, as a tale of hope, hope engendered, hope deferred, and hope renewed. This is a story of the men and women who dreamed of a better life for all of us and of those who tried to create that better life. It is also the story of those who had differing dreams and the conflicts among them. And it is a story of the fainthearted who were afraid to dream themselves and feared the dreams of others. Put another way, I include those who feel that some of the dreams are nightmares. Max Beerbohm neatly caught this feeling:

> So this is utopia,
>   Is it? Well—
> I beg your pardon;
>   I thought it was Hell.[2]

Some go so far as to reject the whole idea of what I call social dreaming. Macaulay expressed this attitude in his famous aphorism "An acre in Middlesex is better than a principality in Utopia." The quotation continues, "The smallest actual good is better than the most magnificent promises of impossibilities" (3:460). My sympathies are always with the dreamers, but the fears have frequently been justified, so they are truly part of this story.

Before it is possible to tell the stories of people dreaming, it is necessary to be more precise about the types of dreams that interest me. In doing this, I make a number of interrelated arguments about the nature of utopianism that help set the scene for what follows. My arguments also show

why I find these dreams so important; as Marge Piercy recently put it, "Dreams are the fire in us" (302).[3]

For some years now I have been struggling with a series of questions that I consider to be fundamental to utopian scholarship. All the questions relate to problems of definition broadly considered. These questions are:

1. How can we best understand the phenomenon of utopianism and its varied manifestations?
2. Is there a utopian tradition?
3. Are intentional societies an aspect of utopianism?
4. Are utopias, as many (Krishan Kumar most recently) have argued, a phenomenon of the Christian West or are there indigenous, pre-contact utopias outside the Christian West?
5. Why are there so many literary utopias produced in some countries and so few in others?

I think I can now answer the first four questions. I still do not have an answer to the fifth question, and I expect that there will be as many answers as there are countries.

Most of this essay is concerned with the first question. The next three questions will also be discussed, but the answers, briefly, are:

Yes, there is a utopian tradition; there are also utopian traditions.

Yes, intentional societies are an aspect of utopianism.

No, utopias are not solely the product of the Christian West; but, utopias as a genre of literature that has certain formal characteristics are most common in the Christian West, almost certainly because that genre is identified with Thomas More, a person from the Christian West.

Having made my assertions, let me now move to the more difficult activity of trying to demonstrate their accuracy. This will involve those tedious but essential processes known as definition and classification, processes frequently ignored by scholars in the field. Most notoriously the Manuels make the unfortunate statement that they do not need to define utopia; they know one when they see one (336). Others have followed them by failing to define even when the subject of their study is clearly at the margins of the field.[4] Students of utopian literature are the greatest sinners in this area. Students of intentional societies are not far behind; there are very few definitions of intentional societies because most scholarship concentrates on those intentional societies about which there is no disagreement.

Over the past two decades utopian scholars have been coming independently to a generally similar understanding that utopianism has various manifestations. Some writers use the word utopia for everything, while others restrict it to the literary genre, but most have arrived at the conclusion that, whatever we call them, there are a number of phenomena involved. There are, of course, differences about what belongs within the constellation of ideas, concepts, and literary genres that hover around utopia, but there is something like a consensus that there is such a constellation.

In order to demonstrate that there is one or more utopian traditions, I have to define utopia, but that definition has emerged from those traditions.

To further complicate matters, we are discussing living traditions which are always in process, only fixable at a moment in time and place. Thus, in what follows, it is necessary to weave a somewhat complex fabric. In the following I try to avoid jargon as much as possible, largely because utopianism is a subject studied from the perspective of many different disciplines and jargon is frequently discipline specific. I also begin from deliberately chosen "old-fashioned" perspectives—descriptive and historical—because I find that trying to sort out the various things that have been called utopian is a useful step in trying to understand the overall phenomenon. Put another way, utopian scholarship is in the state of most sciences in the Nineteenth Century when better description was the basis of building toward more effective understandings of the phenomena being studied. Equally important is that utopias, written in different times and places, need to be understood both in their historical and linguistic context and for what they communicate to a contemporary reader.

UTOPIANISM

I define the broad, general phenomenon of utopianism as social dreaming—the dreams and nightmares that concern the ways in which groups of people arrange their lives and which usually envision a radically different society than the one in which the dreamers live. But not all are radical, for some people at any time dream of something basically familiar.

The most recent and most complete discussion of the definition of utopianism is Ruth Levitas's *The Concept of Utopia* (1990), which carefully considers a variety of past definitions and the current situation in utopian scholarship.[5] Her definition emphasizes *desire* (151). She defines *utopia* so that it is similar to what I call utopianism. While her definition provides no tool for the bibliographer trying to distinguish among works that might be considered utopias, it reinforces the argument made here that utopian literature should be treated as a subset of a broader phenomenon.

The Roots of Utopianism—Where does utopianism originate? It has been interpreted as an expression of class, as a return to the womb or, in a variant version of the womb, as an expression of the myth of the eternal return. Economic, theological, and psychological explanations abound; as usual, there is truth and error in all the explanations. The central problem with most approaches to utopianism is the attempt to use a single dimension to explain a multi-dimensional phenomenon.

Levitas wishes to avoid the conclusion that utopianism is a universal human phenomenon. I find myself drawn to the notion that utopianism is such a phenomenon, and I do not think it is necessary to get caught in the morass of "human nature" arguments to do so, because I do not think it necessary to assume a common "human nature" to conclude that the overwhelming majority of people—probably it is even possible to say all—are, at some time dissatisfied and consider how their lives might be improved. If we are hungry, we dream of a full stomach. If we are sexually frustrated, we

dream of sexual fulfillment. If we are frustrated by something in our society, we dream of a society in which it is corrected. Often we dream even though we, personally, are well fed and sexually fulfilled. We still dream at least in part because, content, we are capable of recognizing that others are not and feel that others should also be fulfilled. At its root, then, utopianism is the result of the human propensity to dream while both asleep and awake.

Crane Brinton wrote, "The utopian thinker starts with the proposition, by no means limited to the utopian thinker, that things (no more exact word is useful here) are bad; next, things must become better . . . here on earth and soon; things will not improve to this degree by themselves, by a 'natural' growth or development of things-as-they-are; a plan must be developed and put into execution . . ." (50). (Today we are uncomfortable with Brinton's use of the word "plan" because it reminds us of so many plans gone wrong, but in the history of utopianism up to the latter half of the twentieth century [and for many writers of utopias after that], his use of the term is correct.)

Two other human characteristics also come into action. While we often simply fantasize, at times we reason about our dreams, and sometimes we even act on them. Still, at its base utopianism is social dreaming, and includes elements of fantasy, most commonly early in the history of utopianism, but they never entirely disappear—probably because a degree of fantasy is necessary to human psychic health. But, of course, to get lost in fantasy is dangerous to that health.[6] And this dual propensity, I shall argue, is basic to the conflict over the political nature of utopianism, particularly the twentieth century argument that utopianism necessarily leads to totalitarianism and violence.

In this essay I explore the ways that utopianism has been expressed and try to answer the first question posed at the beginning. I argue that utopianism has been expressed in three different forms, each with many variants —utopian literature, which includes two fundamental traditions—which I call body utopias or utopias of sensual gratification and city utopias or utopias of human contrivance; communitarianism; and utopian social theory. It is essential that we keep them distinct but not deny the existence of any of the three. I shall start with utopian literature because no one disputes that it belongs to this analysis. I shall have to demonstrate that communitarianism belongs, and although certain social theorists, like Ernst Bloch, are now clearly accepted as part of utopianism, there is no agreed upon list of appropriate theorists, and I shall briefly explore some neglected roots of utopian social theory and some of the implications of the different ways utopian social theory has developed. The most important point is not that we establish a set of agreed upon definitions but that we define our terms and use those terms consistently.

It is necessary to reflect briefly on the nature of definition. Currently there is a strong case made against the possibility of defining since the act of definition depends on where we stand and who we are. At the same time we constantly make distinctions and must do so to have any sort of control over the flow of information and knowledge that passes through us

each day. These distinctions are the root of definition. It is necessary to be able, at least as an hypothesis to examine, to say that something is A or Not-A, utopia or not-utopia, intentional community or not-intentional community. At the same time, it is necessary to recognize that definitions are intellectual constructs that attempt to provide a useful tool to deal with the bulk of a phenomenon. Definitions are rarely or ever useful at the extremes, and the boundaries established by definitions are both moveable and porous or permeable, but for certain purposes (e.g. bibliography) boundaries are necessary.

UTOPIAN LITERATURE

The word *utopia* or *outopia* simply means *no* or *not place*. *Topos* means place; "u" or "ou" means "no" or "not." Thomas More, inventor of the word, punned on *eutopia* or *good place,* and we have since added *dystopia* or *bad place*. Many, many variations exist on these three words; some, like *uchronia* or *not when,* as serious attempts to add to our understanding and others through sheer authorial self-indulgence.[7] Thus, the primary character-istic of the utopian place is its non-existence combined with a *topos*—a location in time and space—to give verisimilitude. In addition, the place must be recognizably good or bad or at least would be so recognized by a contemporary reader. All fiction describes a no place; utopian fiction gener-ally describes good or bad no places. Also, fashions change in utopias; most sixteenth-century eutopias horrify today's reader even though the authors' intentions are clear. On the other hand, most twentieth-century eutopias would be considered dystopias by a sixteenth-century reader and many of them would in all likelihood be burnt as works of the devil.

Previous definitions of the key terms illustrate why these words need to be re-defined and give warning about the perils of any such attempt. For Andreas Voigt utopias are ". . . idealistic pictures of other worlds . . ." (1), and Joyce Oramel Hertzler defines them by identifying a "distinctive char-acteristic" of More's *Utopia,* saying ". . . More depicted a perfect, and per-haps unrealizable, society, located in nowhere, purged of the shortcomings, the wastes, and the confusion of our own time and living in perfect adjust-ment, full of happiness and contentment" (2). J. Max Patrick also based his definition on More, saying:

> . . . a utopia conforms to certain basic features of More's Libellus, which gave the genre its name. A utopia should describe in a variety of aspects and with some consistency an imaginary state or society which is regarded as better, in some respects at least, than the one in which its author lives. He does not ordi-narily claim that the fictitious society and its people are perfect in all respects and that he is propounding a total ideal or model to strive toward or imitate; most utopias are presented not as models of unrealistic perfection but as alter-natives to the familiar, as norms by which to judge existing societies, as exer-cises in extrapolation to discover the social and other implications of realizing certain theories, principles and projects. (293)

Some authors insist that the utopian society must be perfect and *therefore* unrealizable. One goes so far as to say that "Utopia is a place where everybody lives happily ever after . . . ,"[8] which does not reflect the reality of utopian literature. People do not "live happily ever after" even in More's *Utopia*. I demonstrated in an article in 1975 that perfection has never been a characteristic of utopian fiction, but the misuse of the word perfect continues (Cf. Sargent, "A Note").

Robert O. Evan's discussion of dystopia insists that a defining characteristic of the dystopian genre must be a warning to the reader that something must and, by implication, can be done in the present to avoid the future (33). Even though it seems fairly clear that most dystopias do this, using the intentions of the author in this way as a defining characteristic of a genre poses serious problems because, even in a generally didactic literature like utopian literature, it is not always possible to be certain of an author's intention (Suvin, "Defining" 142). Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* (1872) is the classic example of a work that is almost universally called a utopia, but where there is no agreement about what Butler intended. Today, where they are known, authors' intentions are frequently complex and even conflicted. Thus, intention is a factor that a scholar has to take into account, but it does not provide a basis for characterizing a genre.

Many literary scholars in North America are particularly bothered by the use of intention because one of the dominant methodologies in the field in this part of the world says that authorial intention is unknowable. But since other methodologies in North America and dominant methodologies in other parts of the world and in other disciplines (utopian studies is, after all, an interdisciplinary field) accept that authorial intention is important if difficult, it is possible, and, I believe, essential to use it when and where it is possible. Utopias (and intentional communities) are historical artifacts that are brought into being at particular times and places and usually by identifiable people whose reasons for doing so are in principle knowable.

Once created the artifact takes on a life of its own. With utopian literature readers come into play and may, of course, in their reading create something very different from what the author intended. Among our jobs as scholars is to try to understand to the best of our ability both the work the author intended and the work the reader creates. For example, we know on some but not all dimensions what Edward Bellamy intended in *Looking Backward*, what Aldous Huxley intended in *Brave New World*, and what B. F. Skinner intended in *Walden Two;* we also know that even on the dimensions we are sure about some readers create or find that for them Bellamy and Skinner have created dystopias and Huxley has created a eutopia.

Among the recent definitions of utopia prior to Levitas, my definition and the one by Suvin are the most useful. Suvin defines utopia as: "The verbal construction of a particular quasi-human community where socio-political institutions, norms and individual relationships are organized according to a more perfect principle than in the author's community, this construction being based on estrangement arising out of an alternative

historical hypothesis" (132). Suvin misses an important point found in Patrick, who says "a Utopia should describe in a variety of aspects and with some consistency an imaginary state or society" (293). On the other hand, Suvin's definition is important in emphasizing that most utopias are based on "an alternative historical hypothesis" or, in other words, an explanation of how the better society came into being. Utopias are often criticized for simply describing the society without indicating how that society was or could be achieved. While many utopias slight such explanations, they are, as Suvin notes, frequently there.

There is a general form for the term utopia as a literary genre. It refers to works which describe an imaginary society in some detail. Obviously the completeness will vary. Some centuries stressed certain aspects of society and neglected others, and some authors are concerned with certain parts of society more than others. But it must be a society—a condition in which there is human (or some equivalent) interaction in a number of different forms and in which human beings (or their equivalent) express themselves in a variety of ways.

Utopia is primarily a type of prose fiction, but we cannot exclude all works that take the expository form. To cite but one example, Edgar Chambless's *Roadtown* (1910) is written as an essay, but presents a society that can only be called a utopia, and there are quite a few others that fall into this category. But it is a mistake to *automatically* include all forms. Some criteria must be established and rigorously applied, but particularly rigorously to expository forms.

As Glenn Negley warns us, "The determination of whether a particular work is 'utopian' is admittedly somewhat arbitrary; any attempt at a precise definition would surely do violence to the latitude of idealization and expression which is the very essence of utopian thought" (ii). And although some writers have contended wrongly that the basic lineaments of utopian society are unchanging,[9] its literary form has changed a number of times.

I have concluded that our basic utopia, eutopia, dystopia lexicon must be complicated to express the range of materials that authors have created. My criterion in all cases is the existence of at least one work that fits only a single category.

And even one of our most basic terms, *dystopia,* has been generally neglected by critics[10] and recent works such as Marge Piercy's *He, She and It* (1991) which are clearly both eutopias and dystopias undermine all neat classification schemes. The terms good place and bad place simply do not work for *He, She and It* and a substantial number of other utopias written in the past thirty years. Raffaella Baccolini suggests that we should reconsider dystopia in the same way that we have been forced to reconsider eutopia as a result of feminist criticism. She notes that "genres are cultural constructions; implied in the notion of genre and of boundaries lies a binary opposition between what is 'normal' and what is 'deviant'—a notion that feminist criticism has attempted to deconstruct since this difference consigns feminine practice to inferiority" (139). She argues that women writers have used

various strategies to undermine the dominance of genre. Female protago-
nists are a central strategy but so are the frequent use of irony, detachment,
and humor. As she says, "Laughing at the collapse of the Western world and
its heritage can also be seen as a sign of a lack of nostalgia for the 'golden
past' of patriarchy" (139).

The traditional dystopia was an extrapolation from the present that
involved a warning. The eutopia says if you behave thus and so, you will be
rewarded with this. The dystopia, in the tradition of the jeremiad, says if
you behave thus and so, this is how you will be punished. Both, of course,
are suggesting that alternative modes of behavior are possible, but Bacco-
lini, and such works as *He, She and It,* are telling us that unidimensional
analyses simply no longer work. At the same time that we must recognize
changes in the utopian traditions, we need to recognize that those traditions
still exist.

Thus, perhaps we need to look at aspects of that tradition like the
utopian satire, which describes those works where satire overwhelms the
other elements and in which there is no simple good/bad distinction. (The
classic utopian satire is Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* [1872] although there are
progenitors back to Lucian.)

Two other commonly used terms that are sometimes useful give me
pause. *Anti-utopia* is in common use as a substitute for dystopia, but as such
it is often inaccurate, and it is useful to have a term to describe those works
that use the utopian form to attack either utopias in general or a specific
utopia. (Some of the numerous works using Bellamy's future Boston to
attack Bellamy are *anti-utopias* without being *dystopias.*)

Finally, a number of contemporary scholars are using *critical utopia* to
describe that growing category of utopias that present a good place with
problems and that reflect critically on the utopian genre itself. Critical
utopia clearly fits the works Tom Moylan was discussing when he invented
the term in *Demand the Impossible,* but I am becoming convinced that criti-
cal utopias are no longer as important as they were when Moylan initially
characterized them. Moylan writes,

> A central concern in the critical utopia is the awareness of the limitations of the
> utopian tradition, so that these texts reject utopia as a blueprint while preserv-
> ing it as a dream. Furthermore, the novels dwell on the conflict between the
> originary world and the utopian society opposed to it so that the process of
> social change is more directly articulated. Finally, the novel focuses on the con-
> tinuing presence of difference and imperfection within the utopian society itself
> and thus render more recognizable and dynamic alternatives. (10–11)

To take but one example, writing about Marge Piercy's *Woman on the Edge
of Time* (1976), Moylan says it is a critical utopia because ". . . she is aware
of the limitations of the genre itself: its tendency to reduce alternative
visions to closed and boring perfect systems that negate the utopian impulse
that generated them . . ." (151). While I think that this characterization of
the utopian tradition is wrong, we can hardly expect Piercy and other
authors to be more aware of the characteristics of that tradition than most

scholars. *Woman on the Edge of Time* is clearly a critical utopia in that the tension between the contemporary United States and the alternative futures presented is central to the text, but one can wonder if the mechanism of social change described, murder, really fits Moylan's notion of an "articulated process."

Is a "critical dystopia" plausible? Is it simply an oxymoron because all dystopias are "critical" in Moylan's sense? Perhaps Marge Piercy's recent *He, She and It* (1991) qualifies. At present, I still think that "critical utopias" in Moylan's definition were written, are currently being written, albeit rarely, and may well be written again and that we need to think more seriously about the possibility of a "critical dystopia." Therefore, we should keep the concept even though it needs to be re-thought.

Thus we have the following definitions:

Utopianism—social dreaming.

Utopia—a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space.

Eutopia or positive utopia—a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as considerably better than the society in which that reader lived.

Dystopia or negative utopia—a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as considerably worse than the society in which that reader lived.

Utopian satire—a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as a criticism of that contemporary society.

Anti-utopia—a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as a criticism of utopianism or of some particular eutopia.

Critical utopia—a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as better than contemporary society but with difficult problems that the described society may or may not be able to solve and which takes a critical view of the utopian genre.

As noted earlier, one common aspect of past definitions is being rejected here. *Perfect, perfection,* and their variants are freely used by scholars in defining utopias. They should not be. First, there are in fact very few eutopias that present societies that the author believes to be perfect. Perfection is the exception not the norm. Second, opponents of utopianism use the label *perfect* as a political weapon to justify their opposition. They argue that a perfect society can only be achieved by force; thus, utopianism is said to lead to totalitarianism and the use of force and violence against people.

Without the use of the word *perfect,* part of the logic of the anti-utopian argument disappears. Therefore, scholars should use such words only when they apply.

Utopian Traditions in Literature[11]

There were social dreams before any word was invented to describe them, and these early examples of utopianism provide a basic stratum of utopian literature and, in a more complex way, utopian social theory. I believe that there are the two fundamental utopian traditions. These traditions are, I contend, alternate ways of expressing the utopian impulse—that essential need to dream of a better life, even when we are reasonably content. Utopianism is not necessarily a deficiency response. The worst off tend not to have the leisure to write utopias, but such utopias exist—in myth, oral tradition, and folk songs.

The first eutopias that we know of we usually call myths, and they look to the past of the human race or beyond death. They have various labels—golden ages, arcadias, earthly paradises, fortunate isles, isles of the blest. They are peopled with our earliest ancestors, heroes and, very rarely, heroines, the virtuous dead, or, in some cases, contemporaneous but little known noble savages. All these eutopias have certain features in common—simplicity, unity, security, immortality or an easy death, unity with God or the gods, abundance without labor, and no enmity between homo sapiens and the other animals. If women are included (which they usually are not) and get pregnant, they give birth without pain.

Not all have all these characteristics, but there is a general similarity that comes from these features. There is also a similarity in that these eutopias are achieved without human effort. They are a gift of nature or the gods. Well-known examples are Hesiod's golden age, Eden, some versions of the millennium, and various Greek and Roman myths. For want of a better label I call them utopias of sensual gratification or body utopias.[12] They are social dreaming at its simplest. Every culture has some such stories, and I believe that they are the foundation of utopianism.

But human beings do not like depending on the whims of nature or the gods, and as a first step in the direction of taking control of our dreams, when it becomes intellectually possible, identical imagery is put in the future and not after death. Virgil's fourth *Eclogue* is an example of this. While not under human control, there is at least the suggestion of possibility. A second step can be seen in the existence of festivals like Saturnalia, the Feast of Fools, and Carnival where the world is turned upside down for a few days and the poor can have the body utopia temporarily.[13] A third step is found in Cockaigne and its variants. A permanent body utopia is described and, in most versions, the fantasy is presented as possible for some people after going through an almost incredible rite of passage.[14]

The fourth and most important step is to put the whole thing under human control and create an entirely new tradition—the utopia of human

contrivance or the city utopia. Plato's *Republic* is the most cited early Western example, although I think that his *Laws* fits better.

In 1516 Thomas More invented the genre to which these works are precursors. From that point on utopian literature began to have the formal characteristics by which we define the genre today, but the propensity to social dreaming existed well before there was any utopian genre.

Having reached this point, another problem arises. While it is clear that the utopia is the well-spring (and in saying this I am specifically rejecting Darko Suvin's contention that utopias are a sub-genre of science fiction), there are many rivers that flow from the source. If utopias and science fiction are treated solely as literary genres, Suvin has a case, particularly given the current situation in which many utopias are published as science fiction, but both historically and with utopianism treated as here, utopias are clearly the primary root.

In order to clarify the situation, I have constructed a tentative taxonomy. This taxonomy is deliberately historical and reflects the history of utopianism. It is important to note that each item in the taxonomy has changed over time both in its form and in the role it has played or currently plays in that ongoing history. It is also deliberately based on form rather than content. Clearly other taxonomies could be constructed and would provide potentially interesting bases for discussion, but I know of none, and, therefore, this is put forward as a preliminary suggestion.

    A. Myth
        1. Myths of an earthly paradise
        2. Fortunate isles
        3. Noble savages
        4. Arcadias
        5. Heaven and hell
        6. The millennium
        7. Prester John tales
    B. Fiction
        1. Utopias
            a. The positive utopia or eutopia
            b. The negative utopia or dystopia
            c. The satirical utopia
            d. The anti-utopia
            e. The critical utopia
        2. Cockaigne
        3. Science fiction
            a. Atlantis legends
            b. Science fiction
            c. Fantasy
            d. Tales of the future
        4. The utopia of the mind (Daumal, Hesse)
        5. Imaginary/extraordinary voyages
        6. Uchronia

      7. Robinsonaden
      8. Gulliveriana
      9. Fairy tales
     10. Romance
     11. Oriental tales
  C. Non-fiction
      1. Instructions to princes
      2. Political philosophy (many have been included, few should be)
      3. Ideal cities
      4. Urban planning
      5. Visionary architecture
      6. Utopian social theory
      7. Film
      8. Painting
      9. Music

I am certain that this is incomplete and that many streams and rivulets could be added. Also, my arrangement of sub-categories is clearly open to alternative orderings. This is merely a suggestion.[15]

Utopias and the changes they undergo both help bring about and are reflections of paradigm shifts in the way a culture views itself. Sometimes it is possible to identify fairly precisely the role of a utopia or a group of utopias in this process, but all such shifts take place unevenly, and, therefore, different utopias in any time and place may reflect different stages in the paradigm shift, including reactions against it.

But definitions and taxonomy are only useful if they provide some sort of boundary, however porous it may be. When we recognize that all fiction is utopian in the basic sense of presenting a no-place, and so are many reform tracts, urban plans, and architectural drawings, the importance of establishing boundaries becomes obvious, even boundaries that are not entirely clear and that are permeable. Against Baccolini I insist that boundaries are still necessary. I am aware that they are more problematic than ever, but I am forced to conclude that without boundaries, we do not have a subject.

The most important boundary question is that of form. Scholarship on this aspect of utopianism must begin by treating it as a literary genre. Utopias are fictions even when they do not use one of the many fictional forms. Forms of literature change, and there are utopias that do not fit neatly in any non-expository form. These works exist, but the standards for including such a work in a list of utopias must be very high.

Intent provides a boundary but can only be applied with solid evidence, evidence that is least likely to be available when most needed. With utopian literature the scholar must try to deal with this difficult problem of literary scholarship. It is necessary to examine the question of whether or not the author meant to write a eutopia, a dystopia, or any of the other proliferating varieties. This is particularly important because we may find a work the author intended as a positive utopia to be, from our perspective, a dystopia.[16]

It may not always be possible to establish intent, but the attempt is essential. Scholars are always aware that authors do things they do not intend, but with utopian literature, the consideration of intent must be included. Intent is a minefield and should be entered only when necessary and only for the limited purpose of determining whether the work should be classified as eutopian, dystopian, and so forth.

A particular case from the taxonomy provides a good test of the usefulness of my definitions. Most Robinsonaden do not fit my definition of a good place, although out of deference to tradition I have included a few in my bibliography. They do not fit because there is no society, even when Friday is included. It is possible to conceive of a eutopia of solitude,[17] but that is not found in Defoe or many of the other Robinsonaden. What we find is a critique of contemporary society combined with a statement about the abilities of an unaided human being,[18] although Crusoe survives only by mining the shipwreck for the material goods needed, and this is a frequent but not universal characteristic of Robinsonaden. Solitary eutopias are possible, but they are rare and, with these few exceptions, social interaction is fundamental to the utopian form.

Another particular case raises a different issue. Most Gulliveriana have non-humans as central protagonists. Can a utopia be inhabited by non-humans? Here there is no boundary; there are simply too many works populated by non-human that have all the characteristics of the human utopias.[19]

Yet another problem, one that I have waffled on myself, is the Christian heaven. Death seems an odd way to achieve a good life, but I have become convinced both by the number of works involved[20] and by a recent study of the history of heaven by Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang. Hell has not been as popular a resort as heaven, but it is the archetypical dystopia and is sometimes used as a contrast to heaven. Once in a great while the contrast favors Hell.[21]

The last boundary question is content. In the past commentators frequently identified utopianism with socialism, and to me this is the basic problem of using content as a criterion. First, the content constantly changes. Second, content does not give us any mechanism for distinguishing utopias from other phenomena.

INTENTIONAL SOCIETIES

Turning to intentional societies is entering unexplored territory in the sense that there are no agreed upon definitions nor an agreed link to utopianism. In fact, one of the most respected historians of communitarianism in the United States contends that there is no such link (Bestor 230–52). Part of this essay will be an argument that he is wrong. Equally important, though, is the attempt to understand just what it is we mean by the term intentional societies.

As a starting point it is useful to look at some of the terms that have been used to refer to this subject—*intentional community, intentional society,*

communal society, cooperative community, practical utopia, commune, withdrawn community, enacted community, experimental community, communal experiment, alternative society, alternative lifestyle, communitarian experiment, socialist colonies, collective settlement, mutualistic communities, communistic societies, utopian society, and *utopian experiment.* These nineteen labels have differing implications, and I have placed them roughly in reverse chronological order. Thus, the connection to utopianism was explicit in the past, but was dropped both because scholars wanted a more neutral term and because members of contemporary communities felt that "utopian" was a burden they did not want to carry.

There is one thread running through some of these labels. *Collective, communal* and its variants, and *communitarian* all imply an economic system without private property as, in fact, did the word *utopian* in this context. *Intentional* and *enacted* have no such implications, although they have their own implications.

Previous Definitions

Before proceeding I wish to examine briefly some of the definitions used by students of intentional societies, and a selection of fairly recent definitions that are among the best to be found are included in the footnotes.[22] But all these definitions have one fundamental problem. They are perfectly good for the particular communities the authors studied, but most are too specific to include what we know to be the range of institutions actually established. They generally assume a particular model to be the only model. If we have learned nothing else in the past decade, we have learned that communities vary tremendously. Many communities that most of us would wish to include would be excluded by some or all of these definitions. For example, I would find it very difficult to fit the Amish, the Woman's Commonwealth, or Stelle (to use three U.S. examples) comfortably in any of them. I would also find it difficult to include many lesbian communities that are what might be called quasi-permanent; i.e. they exist during the summers.[23]

The definitions that are not too specific are too general; they do not provide any useful boundaries. While a definition will need to cover a wide variety of communities, it also needs to set limits. Once we have such a definition, it will be possible to develop distinctions that will allow us to discuss groups of communities with shared characteristics. We do that already, but we do it as if the group we are discussing represents all communities. I want a definition that will allow us to be inclusive rather than exclusive. We can be exclusive when we want, but we should recognize that the phenomenon we are studying has many guises.

For the reasons given above, I have decided that for contemporary scholarship it is best to choose a relatively neutral term like *intentional community* as the appropriate label. I shall define an *intentional community*

as *a group of five or more adults and their children, if any, who come from more than one nuclear family and who have chosen to live together to enhance their shared values or for some other mutually agreed upon purpose.* I recognize that this very tentative definition leaves out a great deal that the other definitions include, but I think that is a strength rather than a weakness.

What boundaries does this definition give us? The question of intent, which is such a problem with utopian literature, is somewhat less of a problem with intentional societies, except during the period of the Sixties. At that time communal living was such a fad that it is frequently unclear whether the group are college roommates or an intentional society. If evidence of intent is available, and in the Sixties it seldom is, that evidence can be used to help determine whether or not to include a particular group. Intent adds a boundary that some would prefer not to have. Intent excludes traditional tribalism. For example, traditional Maori or Native American Indian tribalism does not fit this definition but modern, chosen versions do fit. Thus, traditional forms do not constitute intentional societies unless these forms are chosen with a goal or purpose in mind. Such intentional forms currently exist among the Maori and Native American Indians, and these groups would be included in the definition.

The group must share some project, values, goal, vision, or what have you. The definition does not specify any of the content of what is shared. Neither does the definition specify anything about the form the community takes. Thus, it can include the Amish, whose unity might best be called cultural, the Woman's Commonwealth, whose members did not always live together but continued to think of themselves as a community during those periods, and, possibly, Stelle, which seems to be moving from being an intentional society to a standard suburban community.

The definition also includes two other elements which exclude certain groups that self-identify with the intentional community movement—a minimum number of members and the requirement that they come from more than one nuclear family. *Communities* and similar magazines coming out of the intentional community movement regularly lists "communities" of two or three people looking for additional members. Clearly these people think of themselves as at least a nascent or becoming community; they intend to be a community, but in most circumstances it does not make sense to consider them one yet. The same thing is true with even a large extended family; until they welcome into the group members who are not part of the family, they are not a community.

It is possible to conceive of exceptions to the boundaries I have drawn, and I want to insist that all boundaries are tentative and porous. I also insist that as scholars we must set very higher standards for moving something across the boundary. To repeat, as committed intellectuals we may identify something that we want to place on one side or other of a boundary, but we have to have strong, defensible reasons for placing it where we do. For example, just as I do not like the idea of Fascist utopias, I may like to think

that the racist right in America today do not create intentional communities, but I have to accept that they exist.

Intentional communities have beginnings, a point of establishment (usually fairly easy to determine), a life, and, for most, a period of disintegration and an end point (frequently hard to determine). After the end point, it is possible to speak of influences. Sometimes, as with the New Harmony community in the U.S., it is possible to identify significant impacts on society. More often the influence is on individual lives. But these influences, when they can be identified and traced are best thought of as similar to the influence of a book or a reader. Both sorts of influence are the residual effects of an action—writing a book or founding a community.

Actually existing communities vary in their cohesion, and members of communities differ in the strength of their allegiance. For some communities and some members some of the time, there is a conscious and coherent self-image. For others, particularly as the life of a community comes to a close, their self-image is less coherent. Some of the communities of the Sixties never coalesced around a goal or a project and never developed a self-image, except, perhaps, among the founders. These tended to be among the most short-lived communities.

One of the problems of scholarship on intentional communities has been over-concern with success, usually measured in terms of longevity. Rosabeth Moss Kanter's *Commitment and Community* (1972), the best-known modern study of intentional communities, has such success as central to her analysis. But success defined solely as longevity fails to take into account the various intentions of the founders and members of communities. Thus, a unidimensional standard is imposed on a multidimensional phenomenon. In addition, even if longevity is valid, what is an appropriate measure? In the United States, most intentional communities have lasted longer than most small businesses.[24]

What problems are we left with using my definition? First, it is easy to produce examples of groups of people who thought of themselves as communities but never had more than three or four members. This was most common in the Sixties, but such groups exist today. Second, it is possible to identify groups who thought of themselves as communes and were perceived as such by at least some outsiders but had no defined purpose. For example, this could be said of a number of groups that coalesced around James K. Baxter in Auckland and Wellington in New Zealand before the founding of the first Jerusalem community and between its end and the founding of the second. Third, how do we deal with communities that are not intentional? As already noted, many tribal organizations raise this problem. And fourth, where does cooperation belong? Producer cooperatives would not seem to fit whereas some, but not all, housing cooperatives would fit.

A first attempt at a taxonomy of intentional societies mostly produces a series of dichotomies and much overlap. Clearly any taxonomy needs much more work, but I have produced below a first attempt at a taxonomy:

1. Religious/Secular
   a. Christian Millennial/Christian Non-Millennial
   b. Jewish Agricultural (United States)
   c. Eastern religions
   d. Spiritual (generalized—no specific religion)
   e. Kibbutz (both secular and religious)
   f. Hermits—both religious and secular[25]
2. Urban/Rural
3. Permanent in intent/Temporary in intent
4. Property holding:
   a. Communal
   b. Cooperative
   c. Private (rare)
   d. Mixed (includes both common and private property)
5. Political system
   a. Authoritarian or Charismatic
   b. Democratic
   c. Anarchist
   d. Consensual
6. Sexual orientation
   a. Celibate
   b. Lesbian/Homosexual
   c. Standard marriage
   d. Some form of non-standard marriage, e.g.
      (1) Complex marriage (Oneida)
      (2) Polyfidelity (Kerista)
      (3) Polygamy (Mormons and others)
   e. Free love
7. Source, e.g.
   a. Fourierist
   b. Owenite
   c. Saint-Simonian
   d. Skinnerian
8. Corporate orientation versus interpersonal orientation (Wagner, "Success" 95–6)

If it provides nothing else, such a list goes some way to making clear just how varied a phenomenon communitarianism is.

Communitarianism and Utopianism

Having considered these definitional questions, it is now possible to see whether or not there is a case for linking communitarianism with utopianism. The next to the last category in the taxonomy—source—provides a *prima facie* case for the link. All four of the sources are regularly considered to be part of the phenomenon we call utopianism. In addition, while the definitions that called the communities utopian are no longer common, they

should not be forgotten. Thus, even looking at questions of definition and taxonomy provides the first step to making the connection.

In the West that connection clearly goes back to the middle ages and monasticism—although some of the definitions cited specifically exclude monasticism—or even earlier and the withdrawn Jewish communities of the pre-Christian era.[26] It is possible to draw a direct connection between monasticism and the early heretical sects that ultimately gave rise to the first Protestant withdrawn communities.[27]

Today, various forms of Eastern monastic orders have migrated to or been imported to the West, and in some cases consciously connect themselves to the Western communal tradition. (Another weakness in the scholarship on intentional communities is that, with the exception of the Israeli kibbutz, it is centered on the Europe and North America, with an occasional bow in other directions.) The International Society for Krishna Consciousness, with communities throughout the world that clearly meet the definition of intentional society used here, is an obvious case of the connection between Eastern traditions and Western communalism. Less well known are the various Buddhist monasteries that have been established in the West and have attracted Western members. Some, such as the Tibetan monasteries, were in the first instance established by refugees fleeing their countries and then attracted local support. Others were established by Westerners who had traveled to learn from religious leaders, primarily in India and Japan. And yet others were founded by such religious leaders who traveled themselves. Thus, in addition to traditional Western forms of monasticism, there exist monasteries (sometimes called that, sometimes called communities, and sometimes called *Ashrams*) that clearly fit many definitions of intentional societies.

There are also direct connections to literary utopianism. The Cockaigne is often seen as a reflection of monasticism either satirically or as a statement of how the poor believed monks lived; More was clearly influenced by monasticism in his description of Utopia; and similar influences are obvious through the eighteenth century.[28] And in a recent article, I showed some of the connections between nineteenth century utopian literature and the communes of the same period.[29] In most cases the prospectus for an intentional society that was never founded is readily labelled a utopia, and fiction about intentional communities both actual and fictional is frequently listed among utopias.

Writers communicate their dreams by writing them down and publishing them, however poor the writing may sometimes be; communards communicate their dreams by trying to put them into practice, however tentative, unsuccessful, or limited that practice may be.

Even those communities that were primarily waiting for a Second Coming in the near future had constitutions, rules and regulations, and agreements about how its members were to live their lives for however many days were left. If these documents had been fictions, we would call them utopias without question. In fact, most of them were fictions in the sense that they did not reflect any reality, even though that was not the intention

of their authors. The forms of expression were different, but one motivation was held in common—the desire to communicate a social dream, a eutopia.

Overwhelmingly intentional societies are part of the city utopia tradition. In fact, one could almost argue that a body utopia intentional society is a contradiction in terms. Still, in the communes of the Sixties, among those that Wagner calls "interpersonally oriented," there were many "utopias of sensual gratification," some of which seemed to be trying to function as if human effort was unnecessary. They did not stay in existence long, but they partook of the early dream.

NON-WESTERN UTOPIANISM

Since most of the world is non-Western, statements that utopias are Western, and specifically Christian, mean that what I have labelled a fundamental part of being human applies only to those influenced by the Christian West. Here I shall argue that those who limit utopias to the West are demonstrably wrong.

First, the questions need to be posed more precisely. While some scholars have at least implied that there were no pre-contact non-Western utopias,[30] the evidence is simply too strong for anyone to continue to take that position. Still, that solves little. The existence of isolated texts is interesting but not very important. The important question is whether or not there were pre-contact non-Western utopian traditions,[31] and while I cannot yet speak definitively, there are such traditions at least in Chinese and Arabic.

Second, why is this important? It is important because those who argue that there are no non-Western utopian traditions are usually tying utopianism to a specific religious tradition—Christianity. My position is that:

1. Utopianism (social dreaming) is a common human phenomenon;
2. Every culture has produced body utopias;
3. There are city utopias and even independent utopian traditions outside the Christian West; and
4. Thomas More invented a particular literary form that spread rapidly. More's invention was of immense importance; it gave a form to utopianism that has been adopted universally. This form sprung from traditions and precursors and has now produced many offshoots.

Invariably, when scholars argue that there are no indigenous, pre-contact, non-Western utopias, it is the city utopia to which they are referring. If they include the body utopia, they are simply wrong. Why are such errors made? First, the scholarship on most non-Western utopianism has been virtually non-existent. Proponents of the current position might argue that this is simply because there is nothing to study, and, besides, it is impossible to conclusively prove the non-existence of something. But there is too much evidence to accept this argument. Second, there is the definitional problem. Clearly, if a non-Western utopia must be similar to More's *Utopia,* it is quite probable that none will be found. But such a requirement

is parochial in the extreme and would exclude vast areas of Western utopianism as well.

If the characterization of the utopian tradition put forward earlier is accepted, both the problem and the argument that there are no non-Western utopias disappear. I can demonstrate that there were body utopias in China, India, and Southeast Asia well before More. They appear to have existed in Japan also, but more work is needed. They also existed in the Islamic tradition, but I do not want to base an argument on Islam because its cultural and geographic roots are so similar to those of Christianity.[32] Still, with other non-Western examples in existence, Islam can be used to buttress my position.[33]

One other question remains to be answered—were there any non-Western city utopias before More? The answer is that there were some in China and India. They do not seem to have existed in Japan, and we simply do not know about other cultures. If intentional societies, as defined above to include monasticism, are considered, there were a number of such utopias in Eastern cultures. Thus, both types of utopian literature and one type of intentional society existed in some non-Western, non-Christian cultures before it is plausible to talk about Western influence, although I am well aware that cross cultural influence is neither so simple nor as late as we often assume.

A final way of testing the existence of utopianism outside Western, Christian influence is through utopian social theory. Has utopianism played a similar role in Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and so forth? The answer is generally "no." Utopianism has existed in the named religions, and current debates over utopianism exists in Hinduism and Islam, but I cannot find the kind of conflict over utopianism that exists within Christianity. There were neo-Confucian utopian social theories,[34] but there was none of the conflict that gave rise to the Western debates, except in contemporary Islam.

And this may provide the answer to the whole situation and possibly even the start to an answer to the fourth question I posed at the beginning. It may well be that at least some of the old argument about the relationship between Christianity and utopianism is correct, if re-phrased to refer to all eschatological religion. It is not Christianity as such that produces utopianism but a set of attitudes that are engendered by expectations. Perhaps the conflict that characterizes much of utopian social theory has some of its roots in Christianity because Christianity simultaneously accepts and rejects utopianism.

For the Christian, utopia is a basic theological problem. First, Eden was eutopia, a typical earthly paradise or golden age. No one did strenuous labor or died. There was no enmity with the other animals, and Adam and Eve and God were close. With the Fall and the expulsion from Eden, all this changed until Christ appeared and suffered as a human, taking on and forgiving some of the punishment.

But original sin was not overcome; that awaits the Second Coming and the millennium when Eden will be restored. Thus, the Christian is ambivalent. Humankind is condemned to an awareness of Eden's past and Eden's

future, but both are beyond human control. Additionally, the Christian is aware of both heaven and hell, and the extent of one's choice of destination is widely debated. The Christian is punished with knowledge, choice and uncertainty. This conflicted attitude toward utopianism is reflected in utopian social theory. In addition, Christian heretics regularly suggest that Eden, Heaven, or the millennium could be had in the here and now if only the dominant institutional church is overthrown. Thus, Christianity provided the basis for much Western utopianism, and the arguments over utopianism within Christianity were among the first developments of utopian social theory.

UTOPIAN SOCIAL THEORY

The third of the three faces of utopianism has not been as widely discussed as an aspect of utopianism as the other two, although that has changed in the past few years. What should be included as part of utopian social theory is open to debate, but it is part of the complex of ideas we call utopianism and, in various guises, has been around for a long time.

While scholars are now primarily concerned with a few twentieth century thinkers, the roots of utopian social theory can be found in the idea of progress and the constant but generally unsystematic stream of thought that can be called anti-utopianism. In both streams of thought and belief the words *perfect* and *perfection,* with their suggestion of completed, finish, static, and unchanging, were frequently used, and the issue of perfection, as has already been mentioned, still bedevils scholarship.

The idea of progress or the idea that the world is either inevitably improving or could do so with appropriate human aid has a long and somewhat complex history that has frequently been told.[35] At its base the idea of progress is an explanation of the nature of historical change, but due to the character of that explanation it became a matter of belief that could lead to either activism or quiescence. The idea of progress was also used to support colonialism, imperialism, and racism. It only fell into disfavor about the middle of the twentieth century, a time when it was difficult for even the most sanguine to believe in inevitable progress. Still, a belief in scientific progress continued for some time, and belief in the possibility of human-directed social progress waxed and waned through the Sixties and Seventies, depending on where one was located. And it is at least arguable that the return of the belief in the beneficent efforts of a free market marks the return of the belief in a progress that operates without the conscious action of human beings.

But, while this may well be the case, and an argument can be made for the existence of a free market utopianism, the explicit position of those advocating a free market is anti-utopian. And, in taking that position, they are the inheritors of a long tradition.

Anti-utopianism in the West often seems to be an expression of the Christian idea of "original sin." As a result of the Fall, the human race is incapable of serious improvement in this life. In fact, for many Christians, utopianism is heretical. The insistence that utopians expect perfection—

something godlike—is part of the basis for labelling utopianism heretical. There can be no salvation for humanity before death.

But, as with most such ideas, this was secularized. Perfection became something impossible or unrealizable, and the utopians supposed insistence on perfection will rain down destruction on all humankind. For example, this is the theme of Albert Camus's *Caligula* (1944); Ernest Jünger described a character as belonging ". . . to the race of men who dream concretely— a very dangerous breed" (81); and George Sand wrote of the French Revolution that "during the terror, the men who spilt the most blood were those who had the strongest desire to lead their fellow-man to the dreamed-of Golden Age, and who had the greatest sympathy for human misery" (qtd. in Pfaff 90). These secularized versions of the heresy of utopia stress the very real dangers created by those who lose themselves in their fantasies and are able to persuade others to join them. But this real danger is expanded so as to include the rejection of all social dreaming.

This results in the reversal of common utopia images. If utopia is heretical, the earthly paradise must be a trick of the Devil and the noble savages are followers of Satan. Attacks on socialism are extended to attacks on all planning (this was quite common in the United States in the Fifties and Britain in the Eighties). Even if utopia is realizable, the costs are too high, and people are simply incapable of utopia. And, of course, the most complete success of the anti-utopians was to make the label "utopian" take on the meaning of fanciful, unrealistic, impractical. In literature this anti-utopianism is expressed in the best of the dystopias, which question the nature of eutopia and what price should be paid to obtain it. Thus, these dystopias are, in this sense, similar to Moylan's idea of the "critical utopia."

The Twentieth Century

In the twentieth century utopian social theory became more systematic and the differences between proponents and opponents of utopianism became at times central to political debate. In addition, Karl Mannheim used the concept of utopia, together with that of ideology, in developing what he thought was an objective sociology of knowledge.

In what follows I shall briefly examine what I see as the intellectual basis of utopian social theory—the theory of fictions. Then I shall turn to some notes on Karl Mannheim and follow this with a consideration of the utopianism and totalitarianism argument advanced originally by Karl Popper but enjoying renewed resonance today, and the argument that utopia is essential to the possibility of social improvement advanced by people like F. L. Polak and Ernst Bloch. Finally, I shall suggest that what I call "the contradictory nature of utopia" reveals a complex set of fictions, both popular and scholarly, that rest uneasily at the heart of these arguments. I conclude by arguing that utopianism is essential but dangerous.

All utopias are fictions of a particular type. On the highest level of generalization, utopian thought can be considered as a form of "fictive activity,"

to use Hans Vaihinger's phrase. In other words, it deals with the construction of fictions. From one point of view a fictional entity is, as Jeremy Bentham put it, "an entity to which, though by the grammatical form of the discourse employed in speaking of it, existence is ascribed, yet in truth and reality existence is not meant to be ascribed" (12). Bentham does not concern himself specifically with the construction of so complex a fictional entity as a utopia; he is concerned with more specific entities and the problem of language as it makes use of them. For example, he uses the word "right" as an instance of an object, "the existence of which is feigned for the purpose of discourse—by a fiction so necessary that without it human discourse could not be carried on" (118).

The only other major theorist of fictions, Hans Vaihinger, approaches the problem from a different perspective. He says that "fictions are mental structures" (12–13). Vaihinger considers the utopian fiction to be a distinct category of fictive activity" (26).

To turn from Bentham and Vaihinger to Karl Mannheim[36] is a fairly simple move. Mannheim posits two forms of fictive activity, both of which are subsumed under utopian mental constructs. He says,

> the term utopian, as here used, may be applied to any process of thought which receives its impetus not from the direct source of reality but from concepts, such as symbols, fantasies, dreams, ideas and the like, which in the most comprehensive sense of that term are non-existent. Viewed from the standpoint of sociology, such mental constructs may in general assume two forms: They are 'ideological' if they serve the purpose of glossing over or stabilizing the existing social reality; 'utopian' if they inspire collective activity which aims to change such reality to conform with their goals, which transcend reality. ("Utopia" 200)

Obviously, Mannheim's definition is simply a lower level of generalization than either Bentham's or Vaihinger's. Still, Mannheim is not speaking of the utopian novel or the communal movement per se; he is specifying a mental set, an outlook on life. But Mannheim's approach is applicable, and has frequently been applied, to utopian literature and the communitarian movement.

The essence of Mannheim's position is that identifiable social groupings (no more precise word being possible) produce thought systems. The social origins of thought systems can be studied and the ways in which social status and mobility have determined the thought can be known. The two most important mental sets are ideological and utopian. The ideological mentality reflects dominant social groupings which are unconsciously obscuring the fragility of their position. The utopian mentality reflects subordinate social positions and escape from the mental bonds of current reality. The utopian mentality is at the base of all serious social change *(Ideology and Utopia* 173–4).

Ideology is, for Mannheim, an almost wholly negative concept. It is backward looking, oriented to an outmoded status quo. On the other hand, he is ambivalent about utopia and argues that the loss of utopia would be a disaster

since it is essential for social change. Still, utopia is not oriented to reality but to a vision of a better life. Mannheim wants both the reality and the vision.

He believed passionately that education, economic and social change, and psychoanalysis could unmask and overcome ideological thought and remove the conditions which produce utopian thinking (*Diagnosis of Our Time* 90, 171n). It is hard not to see this as an example of utopian thinking—even in Mannheim's own terms.

Utopia and Totalitarianism[37]—The tendency in this century has been to equate utopia with force, violence, and totalitarianism. The argument is complex, with a number of alternative and subsidiary positions, depending on perceived responses by opponents. The basic proposition is definitional. A utopia is a blueprint of what the author believes to be a perfect society, which is to be constructed with no significant departure from the blueprint. It is perfect, and any alteration would lower its quality. But this is impossible because there is no such thing as a perfect society, and even if there were, it could not be constructed since it would require perfect people, and we know there are no perfect people.

When a convinced utopian tries to build a eutopia, conflict will arise because, failing to achieve eutopia, he or she will use force to achieve it. Force will be necessary either because people question the desirability of the eutopia or because there is disharmony between the perfect blueprint and the imperfect people. Eutopians will not, and cannot, give up the vision because it is perfect, and people are perfectible even if not yet perfect. Life in a perfect society is best even for imperfect people because they will accept it as better or law (force) will impose it. Antiutopians conclude that only the last alternative is possible. They believe that a deliberately constructed society of this sort can only be maintained by the continual use of force.

Karl R. Popper, the best known exponent of this position, says that the utopian enterprise of creating an ideal state according to a comprehensive blueprint, cannot go forward without a strong, centralized government of the few, which will likely become a dictatorship (*The Open Society* 1:159). This is an argument about belief and the behavior of individuals. As Popper puts it, "the Utopian approach can be saved only by the Platonic belief in one absolute and unchanging ideal, together with two further assumptions, namely (a) that there are rational methods to determine once and for all what this ideal is, and (b) what the best means of its realization are" (1:161). It is basic to Popper's understanding of the world that (a) and (b) are by their nature impossible.[38] This is due in part to our lack of knowledge, and in part to the inevitability of unanticipated effects, the certainty that we cannot perfectly reproduce our blueprint. Moreover, given the unavailability of rational methods, disagreements between utopian planners and engineers will lead to "the use of power instead of reason, i.e. to violence" (*The Open Society,* 1:161). This analysis denies that there is a rational basis for decisions in utopia (1:161–2).

Much of the argument against utopianism can be dismissed as simply tautological or as based on ignorance of the utopian tradition, but an important part of the argument remains, the one relating to the conflict of values in society and the difficulties of achieving social change using models of alternative futures. Today Popper would seem to have won the argument. We hear that utopia is dead because it does in fact lead to totalitarianism. The evidence is clear. Therefore, we must get rid of utopianism. In the rest of this essay I wish to look a bit more closely at the argument and weigh the truth and falsehood in today's received wisdom. Whether or not the questions raised should lead us to reject utopianism altogether must await a discussion of the arguments in favor of utopianism.

Utopia and Freedom—The argument on the other side is not as neat. Some grandiose claims are made which are not capable of proof or refutation, some questionable definitions are advanced, and some compelling arguments are made. The proponents of utopia tend to be more familiar with the complexity of the utopian tradition, although they are equally adept at ignoring contrary evidence. Since some of their positions have been left undeveloped, I shall attempt to clarify and extend them.

Frederick L. Polak's argument is that the image of the future affects the actual future. "We will view human society and culture as being magnetically *pulled* towards a future fulfillment of their own preceding and prevailing, idealistic images of the future, as well as being *pushed* from behind by their own realistic past" (1:15). Polak is not alone in making this argument.

Polak goes on to argue that "if Western man now stops thinking and dreaming the materials of new images of the future and attempts to shut himself up in the present, out of longing for security and for fear of the future, his civilization will come to an end. He has no choice but to dream or to die, condemning the whole of Western society to die with him" (1:53). Obviously, to argue that the survival of Western civilization depends on the continuance of positive images of the future (eutopias) makes them one of the most important artifacts devised by the human race. Not much can be said about the claim. Polak presents considerable evidence to enhance its plausibility, but the argument, by its very nature, remains beyond proof or disproof.

Polak also says that utopia encourages efforts towards the development of human dignity (1:445). This is a neat contrast to the Popperian argument that utopia limits human dignity inasmuch as Polak contends that utopia is essential to our ability to achieve dignity. Again, Polak is rather given to assertion, but obviously if one accepts his first proposition, the second follows. For Polak, utopia means choice, freedom, and creativity. It is a constant mirror held up to the present, showing the faults of contemporary society. I like to think of it as a distorting mirror in reverse showing how good we could look. Utopia rightly upsets people because it constantly suggests that the life we lead, the society we have, is inadequate, incomplete, sick.

Ernst Bloch was one of the most important writers arguing for utopia. His works commend utopia as central to both Marxism and Christianity. For him utopia is a standard by which to judge existing practice. Far from being the road to totalitarianism, it is the road away from totalitarianism.[39]

Freedom means that we are able to perceive alternatives and act to realize preferences. Utopia presents alternatives colored to make them desirable, or, in the case of dystopia, undesirable. Utopia caters to our ability to dream, to recognize that things are not quite what they should be, and to assert that improvement is possible. The dystopian is stating that things could get worse unless we act, and most utopias suggest that whether life gets better or worse depends on the choices made by people exercising their freedom. The strongest form of this argument is that freedom is not possible without utopias. Thus, the much heralded "end of utopia" marked by the changes in Eastern Europe turns out to be just the opposite. The Eastern Europeans have overthrown an old utopia become dystopia in the name of a new utopia that is already becoming a dystopia, as it has been for some time for many in the West.

The Contradictory Nature of Utopia—In the previous sections I have discussed two incompatible arguments about utopia. In one, utopia is seen as leading inevitably to force, violence, and totalitarianism. In the other, utopia is seen as an essential ingredient of freedom, civilization, and even of being human. While it may not be possible to reconcile these extremes, I shall argue that there is a basic ambiguity in utopianism that permits the possibility of both positions containing significant truth.

Much of the original basis for the antiutopian position came from anticommunism or antifascism.[40] It was transformed first by the coalescence of these two positions into an antitotalitarian position, and transformed second by the development of dystopia. More than any past age the twentieth century has appeared to reject hope. There was a complete loss of confidence, but it seemed, and to many still seems, justified. The catalogue of the twentieth century has been read as nothing but failure—World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, the Gulag Archipelago, the rising rate of violent crime, the Cold War, the apparent failure of the welfare state, ecological disaster, corruption, and now the upsurge of ethnic and tribal slaughter in Eastern Europe and Africa. Not surprisingly this has led to pessimism about the ability of the human race to achieve a better society, and the dystopia—warning that things could get even worse—became the dominant utopian form.

Can we make correct choices? This is the question raised by the dystopians. Some dystopias are deeply pessimistic and can be seen as a continuation of the idea of original sin. Ejected from the Garden of Eden, unable to return and unable to achieve a secularized version of it, the human race is incapable of utopia. But many dystopias are self-consciously warnings. A warning implies that choice, and therefore hope, are still possible.

The position taken by Polak, and to a lesser extent by Bloch, that civilization depends on the continued existence of a positive utopian tradition, may appear extreme but can be defended. Their essential argument is that our images of the future help to shape our actual future. Put another way, social forms follow expectations or, negatively, forms that are inconceivable are unlikely to arise. The corollary is that if people's expectations are positive, if they believe that they can or will improve their lives, they are more likely to do so than if their expectations are negative. If they believe that life cannot get better, or that it is certain to get worse, they will not seek improvement of their condition, and it is likely that even their most dire predictions will be fulfilled. Faith in or hope for the future breeds effort. Effort is more likely to produce positive results than no effort. Apathy produces only more apathy.

Although many commentators, including Polak, missed the positive message of the dystopians, there were few positive images of the future available, particularly in the 1950's. The important element for Polak is the image that dominates in a culture, positive or negative, and certainly for much of this century dystopia has dominated in the West.

Utopia serves as a mirror to contemporary society, pointing to strengths and weaknesses, more often the latter. This is one of its most important functions. The author need not intend that the details of her or his preferred society should be adopted. As an alternative to the present, utopia shows flaws in the present by picturing a more desirable alternative.

People can be strongly motivated by a vision of a better future for themselves and their children. Some vision of where we want to go is probably necessary for any attempt to change social relations, but it is clearly essential for great social movements. The most modest reform implies that something is wrong and needs to be made better. The idea of creating a better state requires some conception of a different ordering of society, and while the "different ordering" does not entail a complete utopia, it does entail something similar. Every reformer has some notion of how people should live. He or she may believe that reform—or, let us say, a certain amount of tinkering with the social system—is all that is needed or possible at the moment. But even tinkering implies that the reformer can identify a fault, that it can be put right or at least mitigated.

The opponent of reform is in the same sense a utopian. In arguing that we cannot or should not attempt to improve on the present, she or he is saying either that we live in the best possible world or that any change is likely to make our imperfect world even more imperfect. The first position is utopian. The second is basic to the classic anti-utopian argument. According to this latter position, reform is to be opposed since it is almost certain to produce error. This approach is rather like that in Greek tragedy. In our pride we commit utopia and violate the boundaries of our allotted sphere. Therefore, we must confront nemesis, fail to achieve utopia, and pay for our effrontery through a worsening of our condition. As M. I. Finley notes, when reform movements fail, "voices are raised . . . against the

possibility of human progress, against man's potentiality for good" (19–20). This cycle of hope, failure, despair, and the rejection of hope altogether, followed by the renewal of hope seems to be the basic pattern of attitudes to social change.

CONCLUSION

The expression of utopianism seems to be among the basic strata of the human experience. Misunderstanding, as we have usually done, the essentially conflicted nature of this aspect of our humanity is dangerous psychologically, socially and politically. Failure to heed the urgings of both body utopia and city utopia produces both personal and social pathology, grotesques of the imagination and of politics. The body utopia has been almost constant in its imagery from 1750 B.C. to the present. The city utopia started later and its imagery has been more diverse, but the desire a better life, for order, unity, and simplicity have always been there. This is the utopian tradition and it expresses much of the essence of our humanity.

Utopia expresses deep-seated needs, desires, and hopes. For some authors the proposed institutions are important, for others it is the general set of values—unity, simplicity, wholeness, a comfortable fitting of person and life. Utopians do not believe frustration, poverty, and privation to be necessary for creativity.

NOTES

*This essay has a number of beginnings. It started as one of my first publications—"The Three Faces of Utopianism"—but has since been revised and added to on a number of occasions, most recently as "Political Dimensions of Utopianism With Special Reference to American Communitarianism." I wish to thank the editors of the volume in which it appeared for permission to publish this revised version. In 1993 it was presented to the opening session chaired by Peter Fitting of the annual meeting of the Society for Utopian Studies with comments from Ronald Creagh, Carol Kolmerten, Tom Moylan (who commented in detail on the essay before the meeting), Peter Stillman, and Warren Wagar. In addition I have had thoughtful responses to it from Michael Cummings, J.C. Davis, Vincent Geoghegan, and Ruth Levitas. I have profound disagreements with most of those who have helped me refine my arguments, but as is true in most utopian scholarship, our disagreements are always expressed as part of a mutual search for ways to understand this complex, ever changing, and fascinating subject. While I have not accepted all of their criticisms, they have all raised questions that I shall continue to reflect on and future changes may result.

As a result of this process of development, the essay reflects my intellectual development in the study of utopianism, and, therefore, the ideas and concepts delineated here come from a variety of times and places over the past thirty years of the essay's gestation. In its current form, it is designed to be the Introduction to a book on the history of British utopianism. Many people have contributed to my reconsideration of the early attempts. Unfortunately, any lists will neglect many important debts since I have spent much of my life talking about utopianism with people all over the world. Still, I wish to note a few specific debts related to this essay. Susan Matarese asked me why I had stopped considering utopian social theory and encouraged me to re-think its exclusion. Long conversations with Krishan Kumar didn't

change our fundamental disagreements but did help clarify my thinking. Raffaella Baccolini showed me that dystopia needed re-consideration. Further comments are welcome. Raffaella Baccolini went carefully through the manuscript and corrected a number of errors.

1. I want to thank Ruth Levitas for pointing out this quotation to me.

2. Max Beerbohm. Although it is cited regularly, I have not been able to find the source of this quotation. If anyone knows, please tell me.

3. The U.K. edition has the title *Body of Glass*.

4. To cite but one example, in an interesting essay on Elizabeth Gaskell's *Cranford*, Helen Kuryllo treats it as a part of the utopian genre without addressing the question of whether it belongs there. See her "'A Woman's Text in the Wild Zone': She has recently told me that she no longer thinks that *Cranford* should be treated as a utopia, but others have blithely followed her lead. See the essay on *Cranford* in Donawerth and Kolmerten.

5. In doing so she rejects the most currently most widely accepted descriptive definition, that based on form, put forward by Darko Suvin and myself. See Lyman Tower Sargent, "Utopia: The Problem of Definition." (This article was submitted and accepted in 1972 and held by the editor for three years. When published the word "Problems" had been changed to the singular). Revised as "Introduction" in Sargent, *British and American Utopian Literature 1516–1975*, ix–xxii; and Darko Suvin, "Defining the Literary Genre of Utopia." Revised in Suvin, *Metamorphoses of Science Fiction*, 37–62. For alternate approaches, see J.C. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society;* and, more recently, Davis, "Formal Utopia/Informal Millennium: The Struggle between Form and Substance as a Context for Seventeenth-century Utopianism"; Poggioli; Quarta; and Sawada.

6. For a fascinating exploration of the uses and abuses of fantasy, see Trevor-Roper.

7. For a worst case example, see Widmer.

8. The editor, Jack I. Biles, takes the same position in his "Editor's Comments."

9. See, for example, Mumford and Ralf Dahrendorf.

10. A review of my extensive listing of secondary works on utopias produced only five works that appear to consider the concept of dystopia. These five include a recent work by Raffaella Baccolini that led me to the recognition that this was an unexplored concept. The others are Beauchamp, "Cultural Primitivism as Norm in the Dystopian Novel"; Gordon Browning; Rohatyn; and Wooden. My search was limited to the references already in the computer listing. There are four card files still in the process of being added.

11. See my "Is There Only One Utopian Tradition?" For further understanding of the utopian literary tradition, it is necessary to consult the basic bibliographies. Much more bibliographic work needs to be done, but see the following: Sargent, *British and American Utopian Literature 1516–1985;* Lewis; and Negley, *Utopian Literature*. A pioneering bibliography that made much of the later work possible is Clarke. Other important bibliographies include Gibson and Patrick; and Winter. For references to earlier bibliographic studies see Sargent, "Opportunities for Research."

12. I am not entirely happy with this label because it does not fit all the literature. Still, it fits most of it and particularly the earliest.

13. See Elliott. A related theme that, until recently, has only rarely been included in the background to utopianism is carnival. See, for example, Bristol; and Gardiner.

14. On Cokaygne (Cockaigne) see Ackermann; Babcock; Beauchamp, "The Dream of Cockaigne; Bullough; Camporesi; Cioranescu; Cocchiara; Fortunati and Zucchini; Hinrichs; Poeschel; Rossi; Schmidt; and Sluys and Sluys. For a related theme, see Camporesi, *Bread of Dreams*.

15. I wish to thank Tom Moylan for suggesting the last four items under non-fiction.

16. For discussions of such utopias, see Fitting; Hermand; and Orth.

17. The prototype for *Robinson Crusoe* was a solitary eutopia. See Tufayl.

18. I have found two Crusoe works with female Crusoes; there are probably more—[Charles Dibdin,] *Hannah Hewit* (1792); and *Female Robinson Crusoe* (1837).

19. See, for example, Edward Bulwer-Lytton, *The Coming Race* (1871); Ludwig Holberg, *Nicolai Klimii Iter Subterraneum Novam Telluris* (1741); and C.S. Lewis, *Perelandra* (1943).

20. See, for example, George Wood, *Future Life* (1858); *The Monk of the Mountains* (1866); Thomas Clarke, *The Two Angels* (1867); Eugene Crowell, M.D. *The Spirit World* (1879); Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, *Beyond the Gates* (1883); William Denton, *Garrison in Heaven* (1884); Margaret Oliphant, *The Land of Darkness* (1888); Carlyle Petersilea, *The Discovered Country* (1889); Rebecca Ruter Springer, *Intra Muros* (1898); Thomas Augustus Bland, M.D. *"In The World Celestial"* (1901); William Clarke Ulyat, *The First Years of the Redeemed After Death* (1901); Alfred Kummer, *The City That Lieth Four-Square or Things Above* (1906); Mary Sparkes Wheeler, *As It Is In Heaven* (1906); Arthur Christopher Benson, *The Child of the Dawn* (1912); Augusta Albertson, *Through Gates of Pearl* (1916); George Warren Russell, *A New Heaven* (1919); Isabel Griffiths, *Three Worlds* (1922); Herbert Millingchamp Vaughan, *Nephelococcygia or Letters from Paradise* (1929); Adrian R. Apple, *True Riches* (1931); Neil M. Gunn, *The Green Isle of the Great Deep* (1944); Kathleen Norris, *Through a Glass Darkly* (1957); Lucius M. Bush, *A Peek at Heaven* (1964); Cornelia Hinkley Hotson, *The Shining East* (1964); Michael Frayn, *Sweet Dreams* (1973); and Theodore Zeldin, *Happiness* (1988).

21. I have not explored literary treatments of Hell in any detail. We are familiar with the various hells of Egypt, Greece, and Rome; Dante's *Inferno* shaped its subsequent treatment. Sartre's *Huis clos* (1945) is probably the most famous recent treatment. For studies of Hell in a dystopian context, see Abrash; Caillois; and Rohatyn.

22. "A loose definition of intentional community was adopted by the F[ellowship of] I[ntentional] C[ommunities] in 1953. It sets as criteria for community a minimum size of three families or five adults, an organization sufficient to assure a recognizable geographic proximity of members to insure continuous fellowship. Among the basic concepts of community articulated by the FIC are: sharing in a whole way of life; the importance of the spirit animating community; and the necessity of active participation in community for the maturity of the person and of the social order. At that time intentional community was conceived as the seed of a new social order inspired by the principles of mutual concern, pooling of resources, democratic and nonviolent methods, and a concern for balance between the worth of the person and the social whole." (Bouvard 100)

"A utopian colony . . . consists of a group of people who are attempting to establish a new social pattern based upon a vision of the ideal society and who have withdrawn themselves from the community at large to embody that vision in experimental form. The purpose is usually to create a model which other colonies and eventually mankind in general will follow. The concept of withdrawal, an important element in the definition, eliminates those organizations which through co-operative effort seek to transform society by working from within: consumers' and self-help co-operatives, factory profit-sharing leagues, or even labor unions. These bodies lay some claim to utopianism, but they base their reforms on the possibility of slow change within the existing order rather than establishing a completely new pattern. Hence the groups which withdraw can be logically isolated from other elements in the history of social reform." (Hine 5)

"The ideal of social unity has led to the formation of numerous communes and utopian communities. These are voluntary, value-based, communal social orders. Because members choose to join and choose to remain, conformity within the community is based on commitment —on the individual's own desire to obey its rules—rather than on force or coercion. Members are controlled by the entire membership or by individuals they respect within the community rather than by outside agents or political forces. A commune seeks self-determination, often

making its own laws and refusing to obey some of those set by the larger society. It is identifiable as an entity, having both physical and social boundaries, for it has a physical location and a way of distinguishing between members and nonmembers. It intentionally implements a set of values, having been planned in order to bring about the attainment of certain ideals, and its operating decisions are made in terms of those values. Its primary end is an existence that matches the ideals. All other goals are secondary and related to ends involving harmony, brotherhood, mutual support and value expression. These ideals give rise to the key communal arrangement, the sharing of resources and finances.

"The utopian community may also be a centralized, coordinating organization, often combining all of life's functions under one roof. Economic, political, social, and family life may all occur within the community and be coordinated by it. The community may be at the same time a domestic unit (large, extended family), a production unit (farm or business), a political order (village or town), and a religious institution. Unlike the larger society, all these functions are concentrated in one visible entity. And unlike monastic orders, which may serve the interests of a wider church community, or businesses, which are concerned with the interests of the market or of absentee owners such as stockholders, the commune operates to serve first and foremost its own members; any benefits it provides for the outside are generally secondary and based on the need to support its own. Finally, relations among members of the community are more important than are relations of members or the community to the outside world. For example, in the typical nonutopian, noncommunal organization, such as a business, the nature of the work may determine who becomes a member, whereas in the utopian community the nature of the people who are already members may determine what kind of work is performed. Maintaining the sense of group solidarity is as important as meeting specific goals." (Kanter 2–3)

"Despite individual variations, the communitarian ideal has certain general characteristics. Experiments were usually small, isolated but rarely monastic, self-contained units of people who held certain ideals in common. The term 'colony' came into popular use to describe them. The political goal was often a pure democracy with broad participation, although this sometimes existed on paper rather than in fact. A strong leader could be an advantage. Many experiments assumed a communal nature as members practiced social or economic activities in common. It was an article of the faith that some functions could not be performed alone as effectively as they could through union of similarly minded persons." (LeWarne 4)

"A commune . . . is a relatively stable group of between five and twenty-five adults with whatever children they may happen to have, recruited from more than one nuclear family and strongly, but conditionally, committed to living and working together and sharing as much as possible of their lives. They share the work of the common household or complex of households in which they permanently live. Ideally, group life has primacy over all other except, possibly, that of couples of mixed or the same sex, and their home is designed to further this group life and allow many collective activities and at least communal eating. The group is bound together morally and economically, and interaction in both these respects will proceed in a spirit of tentative and exploratory mutuality. There will be sufficient resources to maintain group cohesion in the face of considerable internal strain and external pressure." (Abrams et al. 45)

"I have used a functional definition in this study. If a community organized its economic affairs, its living arrangements, its practical life around cooperative or communal principles, I have included it." (Fogarty ix)

"Our definition of commune will refer both to the individual and to the relational level of analysis. Let us define a commune as any group of five or more adult individuals (plus children if any), the majority of whose dyads are *not cemented by blood or marriage,* who have decided to live together, *without compulsion, for an indefinite period of time,* primarily

for the sake of an *ideological goal,* focused upon the *achievement of community,* for which a collective household is deemed essential. This definition does not necessary imply a utopian program, a community of property, communal childrearing, or egalitarianism." (Zablocki 7)

". . . we shall base our usage on the broadest conception of the societies to which these terms have been applied. Such societies are deliberate alternatives to the existing social order; they attempt consciously to implement social innovations, not through the direct reform of the larger society, but through withdrawal into a small community composed of those who choose to live by the alternative structures. Finally, the communal society strives to improve life through closer fellowship and the renunciation of material competition in favor of a sharing of material resources." (Wagner, "Sex Roles" 4)

"Very generally, communal living can be described as situations in which people knowingly and willingly share aspects of living accommodation and material goods.

"There is no one model of communal living. In fact there are degrees of communalism, meaning a great variation between groups concerning just what aspects of daily life are shared with the other members. Communal groups differ greatly in their size, structure, social organisation, purpose, philosophy and the length of time they survive. Some are village sized communities with populations in their hundreds—some even in thousands! Others are single households with just a handful of members. Some projects are integrated into mainstream society, and people outside the group and their close associates, may not even realise that a communal group exists. Others are physically and socially separated from the rest of society with their own mini-economy, social structure and belief system. Some, like the Hutterite communities in North America have survived for centuries. Others do not survive to their first anniversary! And of course, between these extremes, there are innumerable variations. Work and play activities, social values and behavior, financial structures; parenting and sexual proclivities, beliefs and cultures in the wide variety of communal groups, often differ more from each other then they do from the mores of society." (Wood 6)

23. See Cheney.

24. Since figures for both groups are hardly perfect, perhaps it would be best not to make too much of this, but since the so-called failure rate of intentional societies has been frequently used as part of the anti-utopian and, more broadly, the anti-socialist argument, the actual figures should raise questions. For analyses of the "success" question, see Cummings, "Democratic Procedure and Community in Utopia"; and Wagner, "Success in Intentional Communities."

25. The hermit as intentional community poses the same problems as the Robinsonaden do for utopian literature, but we do know that hermits lived within such intentional communities as The Woman in the Wilderness and within many monasteries.

26. On monastic utopianism, see Horn and Born; Braunfels; and Hillery and Morrow.

27. See Cohn.

28. See, for example, Mary Astell, *A Serious Proposal To the Ladies* (1694); and Mrs. Sarah (Robinson) Scott, *A Description of Millenium Hall* (1762).

29. See Sargent, "Utopian Literature and Communitarian Experiments."

30. For recent statements of this position, see Kumar, 2–3, 10; and Uemiche.

31. I wish to thank Krishan Kumar for convincing me that this is the real issue.

32. See Al-Azmeh.

33. I have not mentioned Africa because I simply don't know the answer. There were clearly some utopian elements in Ancient Egyptian culture, but sub-Saharan Africa is currently a blank slate. Here is an excellent question for scholarship—are there indigenous sub-Saharan African utopias? The same question can be asked about any indigenous peoples before Western contact, and the few hints we have suggest a positive answer.

34. See Ching.

35. On the idea of progress see Baczko; Lovejoy and Boas; Salomon; Simon; Tuveson; and Whitney.
36. This section is based on my "Ideology and Utopia."
37. This section is based on my "Authority & Utopia."
38. See his "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition."
39. For studies of Bloch's relationship to utopianism, see *Utopian Studies* 1, 2 (1990).
40. Joseph Wood Krutch was a prime example of the anticommunist position. See, for example, his *The Modern Temper* (1929), and *The Measure of Man* (1954). The antifascist position derived from R.H.S. Crossman's *Plato Today* (1937).

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