

P A R T I

The Changing Shape of States

In the world as we know it in the 1990s, no fact about states is more obvious than the impermanence of their boundaries. United Germany represents, above all, a tremendous expansion in the territory ruled by the state formerly known as the Federal Republic of Germany. Meanwhile, states ruled from Belgrade and Prague have shrunk drastically in size: the only certainty about the borders of the states replacing Yugoslavia is that they will be changing. In 1988 the Soviet state had boundaries encircling fifteen socialist republics. In 1991 the state with Moscow as its capital exercised its claims to authority within the Russian Federated Republic only. Questions about its ability to uphold those claims over all the autonomous republics and regions within its designated borders suggest that the shape of the Russian state itself may undergo significant change. Meanwhile, other successor states of the Soviet Union, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, struggle to expand or maintain their boundaries.

But eastern and central Europe and central Asia are not the only areas of the world where fluctuation in the shape of states is evident. The industrial democracies of western Europe are making fundamental decisions that will determine their future as separate territorial states or integral components of a "United States of Europe." The Anglo-Irish agreement of 1985 officially marks British rule of Northern Ireland as contingent on political trends within Ireland. Basque separatists continue violent challenges to the integrity of the Spanish state.

In Africa the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia has substantially reduced the territory ruled by that state. With separatist pressures on the

rise in other regions, the shape of the state ruled from Addis Ababa will remain problematic for a long time. Whether or not part of Chad is ever attached to Libya, it is an open question what borders the Chadian state will have by the end of the century. Morocco, it appears, has successfully expanded its boundaries to include the western Sahara.

In the Middle East, the Jordanian state formally and substantially revised its boundaries in 1988 by excluding the West Bank from its domain. On the other hand, the merger of the two Yemeni states into one seems relatively successful. Lebanon survives on paper, but in its eastern and southern provinces the Syrian and Israeli states appear the actual rulers. Having failed to expand its borders to include Kuwait, Iraq now fights, along with Turkey, to prevent chunks of territory from emerging as a Kurdish state.

In South Asia, central governments in India and Pakistan strain to contain ethnic and religious movements threatening to splinter the subcontinent into at least as many states as were produced by the end of the Soviet Union. Tibet is increasingly restive, returning the question of Chinese rule over that country to the international agenda. Sri Lanka continues to be torn by vicious fighting between Tamils and Sinhalese, suggesting the inability of the Sri Lankan state to maintain the whole island within its domain.

Cyprus, the Koreas, Indonesia, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire, and Canada are only some of the other states whose territorial shape is under pressure or may change as the result of hostile action, cooperative agreements, or both, within the next decade.

From a historical perspective the spatial malleability of states is neither surprising nor extraordinary. Even states that today appear endowed with relatively stable borders are in fact products of wars and other processes of territorial aggrandizement, contraction, or consolidation. Closely examined, the territorial shape of any state reveals itself as contingent on as well as constitutive of political, technological, economic, cultural, and social processes.

Despite the complexity of these processes, change in the size and shape of individual states has often been presented as (and sometimes is) a straightforward function of armed conflict—of the application of force majeure to extend or defend boundaries. Certainly the United States owes its continental size to the forcible seizure of Mexican territories and the victory of the North (“the Union”) in the Civil War. War was also decisive in the mid-nineteenth-century expansion of the German state in central Europe, its reduction in size after World Wars I and II, the enlargement and reduction of the Japanese state’s boundaries in the 1930s and 1940s, and the expansion of the Vietnamese state in the 1970s. Similarly today, in the Balkans, on the Horn of Africa, in Ngorno-Karabakh, and on the

Iraq-Kuwait border, states and would-be state-makers do battle with one another over territories to be or not to be included within their domains.

But the intricate histories of British, French, and Italian state formation show that coercion is usually only a partial explanation, and sometimes no explanation at all, for the changing size and shape of states. Ongoing negotiations over the possible secession of Quebec from Canada, the essentially nonviolent detachment of the non-Russian republics from Russia and of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia, and the reunification of Germany clearly demonstrate that peaceful separation of territories from existing states is possible, that conquest of territories does not necessarily mean their political integration, and that acquisition of a territory in war does not necessarily mean its permanent separation from rival claimants. With respect to territorial expansion and contraction as a *political* problem, it is precisely those cases where force majeure was not decisive in the determination of outcomes, or where it is not expected to be decisive, which are of the greatest interest.

These simple considerations have profound but usually unnoticed implications for the study of states. Most working definitions of the state treat its shape as exogenous to its operation, suppressing the fact of territorial variability by treating borders as historically or externally imposed constants. But since boundaries of states change, the territorial composition of any particular state is a variable.¹ Since variation in the shape of states is politically consequential, definitions that treat the territorial compass of a state as fixed make it difficult to pose crucial research questions because, in addition to clarifying meaning, definitions also place limits on research. By making certain things “true by definition,” every definition automatically prevents questions about those things from being asked.

For the last twenty years, students of the state have typically begun their work with Max Weber’s classic definition—“a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory.”² Dozens of scholars have tinkered with Weber’s formulation to suggest, for example, that an organization might qualify as a state whether or not it seeks to legitimize its use of violence, whether or not its authority is deemed legitimate, or whether or not it possesses or seeks to hold a monopoly on coercive authority. With these adjustments researchers have been able to ask many questions of great interest. But since almost all variants of Weber’s conception abide, implicitly or explicitly, by his stipulation of the exogenously determined or a priori “givenness” of the territorial shape of the state, they exclude or discourage questions about the construction and maintenance of boundaries of “established” states or about the implications of change in those boundaries.³

I should emphasize that most analysts neither assert nor believe that the

borders of a state cannot change. Rich literatures trace the expansion and interaction of various “conquering cores,” patterns of European state development that include treatment of changing boundaries as both dependent and independent variables, and the artificial imposition of colonial state boundaries as the historical basis for the shape and size of contemporary third world states.⁴ But the existence of these boundaries is usually treated as foundational—as accomplished historical fact, as an externality, or as a function of “international relations,” and thus as “background knowledge” for the application and evaluation of propositions about state attributes and behavior. Even analysts such as J. P. Nettl and James N. Rosenau, who emphasize the multiple respects in which “the state” should be treated as “variable,” imagine states to exist within territorial borders that, once arrived at, are constants.⁵

Indeed a rather sharp line has divided study of state formation or development from studies of state behavior. The metaphor of state “building” has perhaps contributed to this dichotomization, implying that, once “built,” a state is “finished” and can then be observed in operation as an intact, completed entity. In general, questions about the territorial composition of states are seen to pertain to their “formation” or “development” rather than to their operation once they have “taken shape.” Thus the “boundaries of the state” have been a major focus of contemporary scholarship, but the boundaries in question are those that separate “the state” from “the society” within which it is embedded, from which it extracts resources, or over which it rules. Meanwhile the territorial boundaries of the state, which circumscribe the lands and peoples within its domain, which determine what are “internal” and what are “external” affairs, or which present the state with that “society” to which it must relate, are seldom present the state with that “society” to which it must relate, are seldom considered as politically constituted, or as having the same constitutive effects, as the boundaries between the state and society.⁶

The main benefit of ignoring the constituted and constitutive aspect of territorial boundaries is to simplify analysis of state operations within those boundaries. There have been other benefits as well. Much of the reason for renewed interest in statist analyses came from the frustration of societally based explanations for economic and political distress in Africa and elsewhere in the third world. Since in Africa, especially, both analysts and protagonists endorsed the boundaries of postcolonial states as sacrosanct, the failure of European-based theories of the state to integrate boundary change into their models was not a problem. Quite the opposite—it helped suppress separatist forces by keeping questions of ethnic or cultural self-determination *within* the boundaries of the new states off political and scholarly agendas.⁷

But when these pressures and proposals do appear on public agendas, and when change in the territorial composition of the state is either the effect to be explained, the mechanism for explaining that effect, or the prime motive or fear of ruling elites, then it is self-defeating for scholars to pretend the immutability of territorial boundaries and ignore their problematically institutionalized nature. If we wish, in other words, to explain the suddenness with which change in the shape of states can occur; why expansion is so common and contraction is so rare; why some large-scale morphological transformations can be accomplished with almost no violence while disputes about relatively small territorial adjustments can produce some of the bitterest, most violent, and most prolonged struggles of our time; and why changes in the shape of states are so often associated with changes in the character of the regimes that rule them and the identity of governing elites; then we need a theory of state expansion and contraction that obviously cannot be based on a definition of the state which treats its territorial composition as a given.

In this light Israel's disputatious and uncertain relationship with the Arab-inhabited territories it occupied in 1967—especially the West Bank and Gaza Strip—can be seen to pose just the mix of substantive and conceptual problems which need to be addressed by any theory of state expansion and contraction.⁸ The purpose of this book is to develop such a theory. Chapter 1 shows that the most puzzling questions asked about the Israel–West Bank/Gaza Strip relationship cannot be answered without a conceptually coherent approach to territorial state-building and state contraction. In Chapter 2 a theoretical framework with the potential for producing answers to these questions is adapted from the “punctuated equilibrium” approach to the evolution of states advanced by Stephen Krasner, Theda Skocpol, and others. I present a model suggesting those answers in Parts II and III, testing and refining it in an extended comparison of two historical cases—Britain's relationship to Ireland from the 1830s to 1922, and France's relationship to Algeria from the 1930s to 1962.

For both contemporaries and historians, the relationship of Britain to Ireland and France to Algeria posed most of the same questions now confronted by both protagonists in, and observers of, the Israeli-Palestinian case. Accordingly, in Part IV hypotheses about conditions for state expansion and contraction that emerge from and survive the extended British-French comparison are used to address the questions originally posed about the Israeli-Palestinian case and about general processes of change in the size and shape of states. The enterprise explains differences and similarities in the outcome of the British-Irish and French-Algerian relationships, specifies the conditions for Israel either to absorb or to relinquish the West

Bank and Gaza Strip, and suggests plausible interpretations for other salient cases, such as the sudden but uncertain emergence of the Russian Federated Republic out of the Soviet Union. More broadly, by integrating analysis of the psychological constructedness of states as arenas for political competition with analysis of how the rules for conducting that competition are exploited and changed, the model and the conceptual framework surrounding it illustrate how research on institutions can be stripped of its bias toward growth and sensitized to both continuous and discontinuous aspects of contraction as well as expansion.

C H A P T E R O N E

Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Disengagement or Incorporation?

Since 1967, Israel has been faced with an agonizing dilemma. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are inhabited by more than 1.8 million Palestinian Arabs and 250,000 Jews.¹ Many Israelis see these territories as integral, even sacred parts of their country. But their problematic status has accounted for the most significant political division in the country's history—pitting those Israelis who favor permanent incorporation against those who favor relinquishing most or all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in return for a peace agreement with the Arab world and resolution of the Palestinian problem.

The outlines of the debate over what *should* be done with the territories can briefly be sketched. Among the key claims of the annexationists is that Israel needs the territories for security, to prevent terrorism and give the Israeli army maneuvering room in time of war. Anti-annexationists respond by saying that the occupation breeds terrorism and that ending it can reduce the likelihood of war. Anti-annexationists also contend that modern weaponry reduces the importance of territorial expanse and increases the value of demilitarization agreements. Annexationists argue that roads, powerlines, waterworks, and economic ties bind the West Bank and Gaza so tightly to Israel that withdrawal would subject the Israeli economy and the Israelis who have settled in the territories to intolerable dislocations. Those who favor territorial compromise point to the continuing cost of the occupation, the millions of hours spent in policing operations, and the enhanced opportunities for trade and investment that would be associated with a peace agreement. Anti-annexationists also argue that demographically Israel will cease to be Jewish if it absorbs the large Arab

population of the territories, adding them to the 750,000 Arabs already living within Israel. They point out that there are already more Arab children in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea than Jewish children, and argue that with such a large and hostile Arab population Israel will be forced to become substantially less democratic in order to remain "Jewish." Annexationists, however, contend that demographic trends can be misleading. They point to the influx of Russian immigrants and the potential of a similar wave from the United States. Furthermore, they argue, regardless of whether Israel relinquishes the territories it will have to deal with a large internal and discontented Arab population. On the ideological level, annexationists argue that withdrawal from the heartland of biblical Israel and the abandonment or dismantling of settlements would be a betrayal of the Zionist principles upon which the state was founded. Anti-annexationists stress that equally important Zionist goals—creating a Jewish working class and a model society and achieving peace with the Arabs—are betrayed by the employment of tens of thousands of semilegal Arab laborers from the territories and the prolonged occupation's corrosive effects on the country's moral spirit.

As confounding as the polemics over what *should* be done with the territories have been, by the early 1980s an equally complex but theoretically more interesting debate emerged over what the Israeli political system *could* do with them. Arguments over whether Israel's absorption of the territories had already, would soon, or could eventually become permanent required participants in this debate to argue as if they had powerful theories—about the political dynamics of state expansion and contraction and about constraints on the institutionalization of territorial states. Because each side of the struggle to ensure or prevent Israel's permanent incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has treated the size and shape of the state of Israel as contingent on the outcome of this struggle, their efforts, and their evaluations of success and failure, can be understood as expressive of hypotheses about how territorial states expand and contract. The theory of state expansion and contraction advanced and tested in this book is built on the logics embedded in these hypotheses.

Precisely because no theory capable of conditioning or integrating insights standing behind rival claims does exist, protagonists and observers on both sides of the issue have repeatedly been forced to reverse categorical assessments of the possibility of Israel's disengagement from the territories. One result of this inquiry should therefore be the introduction of considerably more coherence into the argument over *de facto* annexation's reversibility than has ever been present. More generally, it should make guidelines available for judging, in other settings, the plausibility of policy options entailing the political separation or combination of territories.

De Facto Annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip

One needs a certain amount of historical background to the current relationship between Israel and the Palestinian territories to understand the terms of the debate, the theoretical questions it raises, and how those questions relate to broader issues in the study of state-building and state contraction. In the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict only one kind of proposed solution has ever received substantial support from mainstream elements on both sides—partition. Firm and explicit Zionist support for the division of the Land of Israel came in 1947 with acceptance of the terms of the United Nations partition resolution. Israel's commitment to the principle was reaffirmed by its interpretation of the 1949 armistice agreements and by its acceptance, in 1970, of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. Even while successive right-wing governments, from 1977 to 1984, and from the spring of 1990 to the summer of 1992, rejected the division of the "Land of Israel west of the Jordan," 40 percent to 70 percent of Israeli Jews have continued to express support for a territorial compromise.²

Following the 1967 war, the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip came to form the central focus of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Before 1967 support for partition among Palestinian Arabs as a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was limited to the Communist party, which followed Soviet policy by accepting the idea of an Israeli state in part of Palestine alongside an independent Palestinian Arab state. After the June war of 1967, groups of notables and intellectuals within the West Bank and Gaza Strip became convinced that a Palestinian state in these areas, including East Jerusalem as its capital, could be a viable solution to the Palestinian problem. Although rejected at first by the Palestine Liberation Organization, this "separate-state solution" soon became the actual, if not always the public and explicit position, of Fatah and the mainstream of the PLO. The governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, and even Syria, Algeria, and Iraq have all, since the early 1970s, moved toward this same position—that peace with Israel is possible, but only with return of the territories captured in 1967 to Arab rule.

Thus the policy preferences of many Israelis, Arab positions since at least the early 1970s, and the stance of the major powers as reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 242, all shared a common denominator in the formula of "territory for peace." In 1977, however, the Likud, led by Menachem Begin, came to power in Israel. For the first time in Israel's history the Revisionist wing of the Zionist movement controlled the government. Since it was founded in 1925 the Revisionist movement has advocated a Jewish state in the "whole Land of Israel." Indeed, the Re-

visionism, its youth movement, Betar, its military arm, the Irgun (New Military Organization), and the Herut (Freedom) party to which it gave birth in 1948 have each regarded the East Bank of the Jordan (Transjordan), in addition to "Western" Palestine, as a rightful part of the area over which Jews should exercise political sovereignty.

Herut had little electoral success in the 1950s and 1960s. Without formally renouncing Israel's right to more territory, the dominant Labor party was nevertheless rather easily able to dismiss Herut's emphasis on "liberating the whole Land of Israel" as unrealistic and dangerous bombast. Begin himself was denounced as a demagogue. Until 1967 Herut was effectively excluded from the mainstream of Israeli politics.

The emotional upheaval produced by Israel's victory in 1967 reinforced strong sentiments of attachment to the areas occupied as a result of the fighting, particularly the West Bank, containing the core areas of the ancient kingdoms of Judah and Israel, including, in particular, the site of the First and Second Temples in the Old City of Jerusalem. Five days before the outbreak of the war, a "national emergency government" had been formed which brought Begin into the cabinet for the first time. Within weeks after the end of the fighting this government moved quickly to incorporate East Jerusalem and a number of surrounding villages into the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem. Although some Labor party ministers tried to resist the temptation, the government as a whole soon responded positively to pressures for the establishment of settlements in various strategically and emotionally important locations within the captured (or "liberated") territories.

In the 1970s, Labor party vacillation concerning the proper future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip added to the party's growing image among Israelis as incapable of continued leadership. In the 1970s the Labor party lost credibility and popular support among the new generation of Israelis, particularly among voters whose families came from Islamic countries. Taking advantage of decades of accumulated social and economic resentment, and of a new militance on matters of territory and security, the Herut-led Likud bloc achieved a decisive victory over Labor in the 1977 elections. The Likud was quickly able to form a governing coalition with religious parties increasingly controlled by advocates of Jewish sovereignty over the "whole Land of Israel" and increasingly wary of the secularist tone of the Labor party.

During the seven years of its first two terms in office the Likud plunged into a rapid, wide-ranging, and expensive effort to annex the territories without formally changing their legal status. By the end of this period approximately half of all West Bank and Gaza land had been transferred to Israeli government or Jewish control through expropriations, requisi-


tions, legal redefinitions of public and private land, zoning regulations, and purchasing programs. While the government virtually prevented investment by Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza in industry or agriculture, it spent billions of dollars on Jewish settlements and the infrastructure to support them, concentrating on those areas, heavily populated by Arabs, that had previously been avoided by Labor government-supported settlement efforts. In 1982, for example, the Ministry of Housing and Construction spent 44 percent of its entire budget to support settlement projects in the West Bank (excluding expanded East Jerusalem).³ When Likud took office in 1977, 5,023 Jewish settlers were living in the West Bank (excluding expanded East Jerusalem). By the time elections were held in 1984, however, that number had climbed to nearly 44,000. Housing contracts and other commitments made before the elections raised this number to 53,000 by the end of 1985.⁴ Settlement activity decelerated somewhat between 1986 and 1990, during which the Likud shared power in uneasy coalitions with the Labor party, but exploded again under the auspices of the third Likud-led government from 1990 to 1992 (see Fig. 1).

The Debate over Irreversibility

By the mid-1980s the West Bank and Gaza Strip contained more than 140 Jewish settlements, including half a dozen towns, large-scale military dispositions, billions of dollars of infrastructural investments, and more than 140,000 Jewish settlers, about two-thirds of whom lived in neighborhoods built within the seventy-five square kilometers of expanded East Jerusalem. These developments led many Israelis to the conclusion that the Likud was succeeding, or even had succeeded, in eliminating options for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, making their permanent absorption into Israel only a matter of time. Included among those who came to view the annexation process as irreversible (or virtually so) were both delighted advocates of the policy and despairing opponents.

On the other side of the "empirical" argument over the relative likelihood of incorporation or disengagement were those who maintained that the links between Israel and the territories could still be severed. They included advocates of permanent incorporation who still doubted that the absorption process had been completed, joined by those who opposed annexation and believed the struggle against processes of incorporation should continue. For some Israelis, including settlers made uneasy by Israel's evacuation of the Sinai settlements in April 1982, and for dovishly inclined politicians, whose platforms required the possibility of a territorial

Figure 1. Jewish population in the West Bank



compromise with the Arabs, conclusions of irreversibility seemed premature. These participants in the debate, both annexationists and anti-annexationists, argued that however difficult it might be to disengage Israel from the territories, and although the crisis surrounding such a decision might even lead the country into civil war, disengagement could still not be considered impossible.

The protagonists in this debate over whether Israel could (not “should”) disengage from the territories seldom argued over the “facts” of the matter. But the disagreements were vivid. The best known and most influential advocate of the irreversibility thesis was Meron Benvenisti, an urban planner by profession, a former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, and a well-known political activist on the dovish-liberal left. In a widely publicized speech in Washington, D.C., in October 1982, Benvenisti described Israel’s ability to reverse the “de facto annexation” of the territories as “five minutes to midnight.” Within three more years, he predicted, there would be one hundred thousand Jewish settlers in the West Bank (excluding expanded East Jerusalem). “If this occurs, it will become impossible for any Israeli government to relinquish control.” “Time is running out,” he wrote in late 1982. “The data show us clearly that the processes of integration known as ‘annexation’ (although this is no more than a legal expression for a much deeper process) are advancing very quickly to a point of no return.”⁵

Benvenisti’s warnings about a swiftly approaching “point of no return” pleased dovish/Labor party circles in Israel and even many Arabs because they gave urgency to struggles against annexation. The question before the country, said former Foreign Minister Abba Eban in 1982, was whether the desire of half the Israeli nation “to have permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza can be effective against all the dynamics of objective fact that work in a different direction.”⁶ Peace Now, the largest nonpartisan organization in Israel dedicated to achieving a territorial compromise, issued a fifteen-page pamphlet in 1983 comparing the settlements to the “baobob tree” in the children’s book *The Little Prince*. In this fable, seeds of the baobob tree produce roots that spread with unstoppable force until they destroy the entire planet in whose soil they are planted. According to the analysis in this pamphlet, the settlement of a hundred thousand Jews on the West Bank would turn the “Greater Israel” idea of the annexationist right into a “self-fulfilling prophecy”—described as a “terrifying prospect” liable to be achieved “in another five—or even three—years.” “Peace Now,” the pamphlet was subtitled, “*before it’s too late.*” In 1983 Palestinian notables such as Elias Freij of Bethlehem and Rashad a-Shawa in Gaza, as well as King Hussein of Jordan and President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, warned that the “point of no return,” after which

Israel's de facto annexation of the territories would be irreversible, was only months or even weeks away.⁷

But by 1983 and 1984 Benvenisti had completed a number of studies documenting just how pervasive was the Israeli presence in the territories and how routinized the dynamic of its expansion had become. No longer did he argue that it was "five minutes to midnight." Instead, he declared, midnight had arrived. Like it or not, he maintained, the "critical point" had been passed. For all intents and purposes, Israeli separation from the territories had become impossible.⁸

According to the settlers themselves, their presence was meant to have just the effect Benvenisti was describing, to "reduce the ability of a government—any government—to play 'tricks' with the political future of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District."⁹ It was hardly surprising, therefore, that annexationist politicians, settlement planners, and many settlers themselves were delighted with Benvenisti's findings. Yuval Neeman, head of the extreme right-wing Tehiya (Renaissance) party, predicted that by stepping up its settlement efforts, "in two years, a situation will be reached where there will no longer be a physical possibility of tearing off any part of Eretz Yisrael."¹⁰ Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, appointed by Begin (during his first government) as chairman of a semisecret committee to plan and coordinate policies toward the territories, proudly cited Benvenisti's findings.

The policies of the government were indeed designed to guarantee Israeli rule over Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District for an unlimited period. I am delighted that Benvenisti arrived at the conclusion, by means of scientific research, that the facts on the ground prove the success of the government in fulfilling its mission. Certainly this finding is contrary to his political position, but the fact that he came to his conclusions through purely scientific research can only make me happy.¹¹

By the middle of 1984, declared *Nekuda*, the leading journal among settlers in the territories, the point of no return had been passed. It claimed that "by the end of this summer there will be, with the help of God, nearly 50,000 Jews living in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district . . . enough, in terms of creating settlements and political facts, to guarantee the hold of the Jewish people on the heart of the Land of Israel for generations to come."¹²

Not all Israelis who accepted the irreversibility thesis were as pleased as annexationist politicians, settlement planners, and Gush Emunim settlers. The rush by middle-class Israelis to buy government-subsidized land and homes in the West Bank intensified in 1983 and was deeply disturbing to many Israelis opposed to the annexation of the territories. Dovish jour-

nalists, with reputations for being better informed than virtually anyone else on the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, were torn between sensations of despair and desperate hopes that somehow territorial compromise might still be possible. At the beginning of 1982, Dani Rubinstein, who subsequently won Israel's top journalism prize for his reporting on West Bank affairs, cited a lecture by Benvenisti which helped him formulate his own judgment more clearly, "the gist of which is that there is no chance that Israel will be able to give up as much as one meter in the West Bank and in Gaza, even if it wishes to do so."¹³ Yehuda Litani, West Bank correspondent for *Haaretz*, commented in January 1983 that seven weeks was not an exaggerated estimate for the amount of time left before negotiating initiatives toward a territorial compromise might be irrelevant.¹⁴ In early February Amos Elon wrote that settlement of the Nablus area was "ruling out (perhaps forever) the possibility of repartitioning Palestine/Eretz Yisrael."¹⁵ Later that same month Elon wrote that "for all practical purposes [Judea, Samaria, and Gaza] have already been annexed to the State of Israel, perhaps irrevocably."¹⁶

On the other hand, despite dovish despair and the informed judgments of most journalists and observers, plenty of annexationists still worried that perhaps the point of no return had not yet been passed. In February 1984, Yuval Neeman, head of the government's Interministerial Committee on Settlement, complained that cuts in the settlement budget were very dangerous, precisely because an irreversible situation had not yet been created: "Settlement is the key. Every one million dollars that settlement lacks [today] could boomerang on us later."¹⁷

Indeed the economic crisis in Israel that began in 1984, combined with instances of corruption and mismanagement in the implementation of settlement policies and Labor party participation in the first national unity government, contributed to something of a slowdown in the rate of settlement expansion. Benvenisti, however, no longer even bothered to qualify his declarations of irreversibility. In his institute's report on West Bank developments for 1986, he argued that since 1983, in fact, "a 'West Bank entity' had no longer existed except in theory." Scathingly he attacked Israeli doves who still maintained that a solution based on the separation of Israel from the territories was possible, characterizing the "liberal psyche" as "too fragile for . . . cruel facts" and as desperately seeking to ignore "the phantoms whispering that the future has already arrived, that we have passed the point of no return, that we have crossed the red line." By January 1987, when these words were written, he maintained that what had emerged was a new, larger state: "The distinction between Israel's sovereign territory and the area in which it rules by military government has long since lost its meaning, as it acts as sovereign, for all intents and

purposes, in the whole of the area west of the Jordan river, changing the law as it wishes, and creating permanent facts.”¹⁸

According to Benvenisti, the Palestinian problem had been transformed from a foreign policy question to a protracted “communal war” *within* a binational society.¹⁹ The corollary of this analysis, that the cumulative array of social, economic, and political forces driving Israel toward a situation of permanent incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had become unstoppable, was that Israelis with progressive values as well as U.S. policymakers were wasting their time unless they virtually reversed the focus of their activities. If Israeli progressives and U.S. policymakers were sincere in their commitment to justice for Arabs, then they must shift their efforts, he argued, toward improving the conditions of life for West Bank and Gaza Arabs within the “dual society” and “*herrenvolk* democracy” into which Israel had been transformed by the annexation process. By continuing a fruitless struggle to reverse a completed process of de facto annexation, Israeli doves and U.S. diplomats were only aggravating the problem by preserving false hopes, justifying the exclusion of Palestinian Arabs from access to political rights, and postponing the mobilization of Palestinian sentiment behind demands for Israeli citizenship.²⁰

With the continuation of rapid settlement expansion in the West Bank, anti-annexationist reaction to Benvenisti’s warnings of irreversibility began to change. By 1984 both Palestinians and Israeli doves had become increasingly sensitive to the depressing effect which the apparent success of the de facto annexation process was having on the morale of the anti-annexationist camp.²¹ “Never in politics is never,” said Elias Freij in April 1984, a year after he had endorsed Benvenisti’s conclusion that the “midnight” of annexation was only weeks or months away.²² By 1984 Eban shifted from use of Benvenisti’s argument and data to mobilize anti-annexationist forces and encourage international involvement to scornful rejection of their importance and of Benvenisti himself as a defeatist and Likud ally. Eban labeled Benvenisti’s analysis of the impact of settlement “nonsensical.” “So the Arabs aren’t a hundred percent [of the West Bank and Gaza Strip population], they’re only 98 percent. So what? There’s nothing that can change the predominantly non-Jewish character of those territories. . . . If the logic of the partitionist position is destroyed by 7,000 families—of whom some thousands have, incidentally, retained their solid foothold on the Israeli side—that’s absurd.” According to Eban, it was not Benvenisti’s dovish critics, but Benvenisti himself and those who hailed his findings as sealing the fate of the Land of Israel, who suffered from a psychologically based distortion of reality, including “an almost fetishistic attachment to roads.” “Benvenisti goes on to say, ‘Look at the infrastructure.’ He stands before these great road systems and asks how people

are going to move out now that so many great roads have been built. I wish he'd go see the roads in Algeria and in Kenya. The world is full of road systems, built from Roman times onward, and the architects of those systems have long since vanished."²³

Two years and twenty thousand settlers later, Eban still dismissed the argument that settler political pressure had robbed future Israeli governments of disengagement options. Indeed, he now appeared to reject the principle that settlement of the territories, however substantial and long-lived, could rule out Israeli disengagement from them. The idea that the "spectacular marginality" of fifty thousand "puny illicit squatters" could prevent territorial compromise in this way was "preposterous" and "an insult . . . on Israel's statehood." Such "seditious nonsense," he continued, "deserves therapeutic treatment, with all possible patience and concern."²⁴ Some doves began to argue that Benvenisti, Likud politicians, government officials, Gush Emunim settlers, and the "expert" journalists were wrong about *de facto* annexation having passed the point of no return. The opposite was the case. It was Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza that was inevitable, not the permanent incorporation of those areas. "Nothing will help the settlers," wrote Boaz Evron. "The basic reason is that the tide of history has simply begun flowing against them. The fundamental facts of policy and demography that cannot be overcome have begun to make themselves felt."²⁵ The absorption of the territories into Israel neither had been nor was being achieved. Of all the possible scenarios it was, said Eban, the "only intrinsic impossibility, because it goes against the laws of political gravity."²⁶

The debate seesawed, responding year to year and even month to month to changes in the identity of key ministers, the size of budgets, and the demand for West Bank housing as well as to fluctuations in the vigor of Palestinian, American, and other international opposition to *de facto* annexation. The switch of so many anti-annexationists, from warning of or perceiving irreversibility to denouncing the very possibility of a point of no return, was neatly mirrored in the fears aroused among Gush Emunim settlers that their euphoria over the putative passage of the point of no return, in 1983 and early 1984, had been premature. In the midst of the painful aftermath of the Lebanon War, with Israeli troops still struggling to maintain order among warring Muslim, Christian, and Druse factions, and the economic disaster of triple-digit inflation, the 1984 elections brought down the Likud government. However, the electorate was so evenly divided between annexationists and anti-annexationists that the Labor party and its allies were not able to establish a government of their own.²⁷ The result was an awkward arrangement, known as a "national unity government." Beginning in September 1984, Shimon Peres served as

prime minister, until the “rotation” in October 1986, at which time Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir took his place—each presiding over a cabinet evenly divided between the two large parties and their respective allies.²⁸

During Peres’s premiership he made energetic efforts to negotiate with Jordan over the future of the territories and implemented austerity measures, including a freeze on the construction of new settlements. Combined with several highly publicized scandals in which would-be suburban settlers lost considerable amounts of money, and the embarrassing discovery of a Jewish terrorist underground comprised of Gush Emunim activists, these policies encouraged anti-annexationists even as they weakened the confidence of the annexationist camp. *Nekuda* editorials, which in the spring and summer of 1984 had been trumpeting the effective consummation of the de facto annexation process, now began to warn that Israeli disengagement from at least parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was still a dangerous possibility. In November 1984, *Nekuda* described the threat of a renewed effort by newly reelected President Ronald Reagan to implement the September 1982 “Reagan plan” for granting West Bank Arabs “autonomy” within the framework of Jordanian rule. Current speculation about the plan, the editors pointed out, would be enough to cause many potential settlers to reconsider their decisions if now were the time they had intended to move. To avert this threat, the editors called upon Gush Emunim and its supporters to “persuade potential settlers that, *precisely because it appeared to be so unpropitious a time, that now is the time to settle. The great and growing Jewish presence in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is the surest guarantee that the Reagan plan—and all other similar plans that may appear—will not be brought to fruition.*”²⁹

For the next two years *Nekuda* editorials and articles emphasized the deleterious effects of cutbacks in expenditures, the failure of government and World Zionist Organization agencies to meet the targets specified in the “100,000 plan,” the gradual return of Arab farmers and home-builders to lands transferred to Israeli control, and the lack of vigor with which parties supposedly committed to the integrity of the “whole Land of Israel” were defending the interests of the settlement movement.³⁰ In June 1985 one *Nekuda* editorial typical of the period criticized the previous government “for having done too little to close options.”³¹ In August *Nekuda* warned the Herut party, “the central political body committed, absolutely, to the integrity of the whole Land of Israel,” that while it was absorbed in destructive internal rivalries, “the Labor party is preparing to surrender the heart of the Land of Israel and is freezing the growth of settlements there.”³²

During this period, however, Benvenisti’s view did not change. From 1983 until 1988, support for his view of the impossibility of separating

the West Bank from Israel came not only from confident Israeli annexationists and their pessimistic opponents, but from sober, middle-of-the-road Israeli academics and politicians, respected non-Israeli observers, U.S. diplomats, and even some Palestinians. In June 1983 a political solution based on unification of Israel and the territories was described as an “inevitability” in a report prepared by nine well-known Israeli academics and political figures.³³ Between 1983 and 1988 Benvenisti’s views were quoted dozens of times by American journalists based in Israel. Many outside observers and U.S. diplomats responded to images of irreversibility by opposing, de-emphasizing, or abandoning efforts to achieve negotiations toward a land-for-peace settlement. “The burden of proof is now awesome,” wrote Larry Fabian of the Carnegie Endowment in the spring of 1983, “for anyone wishing to conclude that Israel can or will turn back the clock on the West Bank.” Despite his sympathy for the Labor party’s traditional policy of “land for peace” and his appreciation of why its leadership had to act “as if it genuinely believes that the passage of so much time on the West Bank has mattered so little,” Fabian remarked that “Labor’s solutions for the West Bank and Palestinians simply strain credibility.”³⁴ In August 1983 a State Department official explained the U.S. veto of a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning West Bank and Gaza settlements by labeling the debate over the legality of Israeli settlements “sterile.” It was no longer “practical,” he said, “or even appropriate to call for the dismantling of the existing settlements.”³⁵

Even some Palestinians began to interpret the de facto annexation process as demanding a fundamental reorientation of Palestinian political strategy. In October 1985, Sari Nusseibeh, a leading Palestinian intellectual and scion of a well-known family, suggested that Palestinians consider the option of demanding annexation and full rights as Israeli citizens as the “best solution under present circumstances.” He predicted that “if Palestinians were to become Israeli citizens, they could win between twelve and sixteen Knesset seats and exert influence to attain their interests by means of the state.”³⁶ In February 1987 he described as “already evident” the Palestinians’ “‘instinctive’ shift from outright rejection of Israel to exploitation of its social, economic and legal resources.”³⁷ In 1987 Hana Siniora, editor of the East Jerusalem newspaper *Al-Fajr* and a prominent supporter of the Arafatist mainstream within the PLO, announced his intention to run as a candidate in upcoming Jerusalem municipal elections. This move represented a sharp break with the Palestinian consensus since 1967, which was to boycott Jerusalem municipal elections in order not to give legitimacy to Israeli claims of annexation.³⁸ On the eve of the *intifada* Moshe Amirav, a former Likud activist dismissed from the party because of his contacts with PLO supporters, reported on his conversations with

“a new group of Palestinian figures.” They had reached the conclusion, he said, “that in the present circumstances it is no longer possible to divide the land between two peoples. Therefore they would rather become part of the State of Israel and conduct a national struggle from within through political means.”³⁹

A Conflict of “Inexorable Logics”

A striking feature of the *de facto* annexation debate is that what many who argued the irreversibility point deemed “illusion” or “fantasy” (that Israel could ever disengage from the West Bank and Gaza) was often interpreted as obvious and even inevitable by those who argued disengagement options were still open. On the other hand, what the latter held to be utterly impossible, namely, a stable but unannounced incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel, “irreversibilists” labeled as either palpable reality or inevitable.⁴⁰ “Who here has the Messianic fantasy,” asked one journalist writing about West Bank settlements, “Sarid [a prominent secular anti-annexationist] or Levinger [a firebrand Gush Emunim rabbi]?”⁴¹ In 1985 Jonathan Frankel, a historian at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, expressed the frustration of observers confronted with two utterly persuasive but contradictory answers to one of the most important questions facing the country: “Is this situation permanent?” He responded that “one form of inexorable logic says that close to 1.5 million people cannot be permanently deprived of political rights by a parliamentary democracy in the twentieth century and that autonomy, some form of independence, must result eventually. But is it no less logical to argue that 50,000–100,000 colonists, backed by a population ever more accustomed to rule over others, will never voluntarily permit such liberation?”⁴²

Subsequent events seemed, temporarily at least, to deprive this conundrum of some of its vexing symmetry. The Palestinian uprising, which began in December 1987, led many doves who had despaired of ever separating Israel from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to declare that the process toward separation had now itself become irreversible and the establishment of a Palestinian state in those territories inevitable. For example, in 1982 Dani Rubinstein had declared that because of massive settlement and other related activities, there was “no chance that Israel will be able to give up as much as one meter in the West Bank and in Gaza.” In July 1988, after only seven months of *intifada*, Rubinstein described the significance of the settlements in different, but no less categorical terms.

What future can there be for a few thousand, or even several score thousand Israelis, awash in a sea of more than 1.5 million Palestinian Arabs who want only to rid themselves of Israeli governance? How many more millions can we invest in this movement which, under the circumstances, hasn't a prayer of attracting Jewish settlers—and all the dreams of “Judaizing” the West Bank and Gaza are (and always have been) but vain illusions?⁴³

In the United States, much attention was given to an August 1989 Rand Corporation study titled *The West Bank of Israel: Point of No Return?* Reflecting the impact of the *intifada* on perceptions of the de facto annexation process, the “point of no return” at issue in this study was not the putative irreversibility of Israeli absorption of the territory, but what the author judged the irreversible emergence of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.⁴⁴ Likewise, in September 1989 an Israeli journal linked to the Ratz party devoted an entire issue to the practical aspects of accommodating what it announced was the “inevitable” emergence of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. “It may be far away,” wrote the editors of *Politika*, “and for some Israelis a Palestinian state is a nightmare . . . but it is an unavoidable solution. A public willing to open its eyes must begin to get used to it.”⁴⁵

Even Meron Benvenisti reformulated his position. In a symposium held on January 30, 1990, at the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem, Benvenisti no longer argued that the annexation process was “irreversible” or that it had passed some sort of “critical point” or “turning point.” Rather, he said, “it is possible to partition the land, to create a Palestinian state . . . but a partition solution is not a necessary or inevitable scenario . . . it can happen, but it is not true that it *must* happen.”⁴⁶ Thus did the problem, as defined by Benvenisti, also shift from whether permanent incorporation had been made inevitable to whether its opposite, territorial withdrawal and creation of a Palestinian state, had become inevitable.⁴⁷

On the other side of the political fence, most of those annexationists who had argued that the process had become irreversible also appeared to modify or abandon their claims, though without giving up their belief that permanent incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel could or would be achieved. In the spring of 1990 even Gush Emunim's most optimistic, confident leaders changed the substance and tone of their analysis. Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun was the leader of the camp within the settler movement that had stressed the decisiveness of what had already been accomplished and the importance of avoiding expressions of nervousness, threats of violence, or other strident challenges to government authority.⁴⁸ In the spring of 1990, however, even Ben-Nun warned of the imminent danger of decisions leading toward territorial compromise. The announce-

ment of such decisions by a government dependent in the Parliament on non-Zionists (Israeli Arabs and ultraorthodox Jews) would, he declared, cross “our red line,” leading, “God forbid,” toward “transformation of the war of the people of Israel and its state against the Palestinians, to another sort of war, worse than all others, a civil war.”⁴⁹

Thus virtually every participant in this debate over the “irreversibility” of de facto annexation changed position on the issue in the face of fluctuating rates of settlement activity and changing political, economic, and demographic trends. These fluctuations continued. By mid-1991 a combination of high levels of immigration and accelerated construction of new settlements in the territories led many protagonists and observers to warn of, or celebrate, the soon-to-be inevitable incorporation of the territories—judgments they suddenly very much doubted due to the victory of anti-annexationist parties in the June 1992 elections.

Between “Secession” and “Decolonization”

In the modern world, empires are expected to break apart. In accordance with that expectation political scientists and historians studying relationships between established states and territories under the rule of those states have been limited by an implicit distinction between relationships seen as natural and permanent and those seen as artificial and temporary. Separation of an outlying territory from an established state is usually considered “secession” if the link between the state and the outlying territory is or was presumed permanent and “decolonization” if the link is or was presumed temporary.

Thus Ronald Reagan’s depiction of the Soviet Union an “evil empire” was understood as a rhetorical challenge to both the legitimacy and permanence of Moscow’s rule over its territories and peoples. As things turned out, the characterization was potent analytically as well as polemically. The size and shape of the Soviet state was far more susceptible to large-scale change than Reagan or any of his advisers had imagined. Nevertheless, when independent republics proliferated in the wake of a Soviet state unwilling or unable to enforce its claims to sovereignty, the achievement of independence by these new states was almost always termed “secession,” not “decolonization.” This “ordinary language” description reflected preexisting assumptions that the Soviet Union was a coherent and, for all intents and purposes, permanent entity; it also reflected desires to distinguish the end of the Soviet “empire” in eastern Europe from the end of the Soviet state’s control over the territory of the USSR.

The surprise and terminological confusion occasioned by the breakup

of the Soviet Union were partially due to the underdevelopment of theory about change in the size and shape of states, conceptual limits which forced category errors on observers of Soviet and post-Soviet society. If all relationships between central states and peripheral territories are to be divided into those presumed permanent and those presumed temporary, and if pressures to sever those relationships can only be understood as secessionism or decolonization, then how can problematic relationships be analyzed—relationships for which neither sort of presumption exists? If the Soviet Union were an empire, then why would the independence of Ukraine or Uzbekistan be understood as “secession?” But if the separation of those territories from the state ruled from Moscow were deemed “decolonization,” then with what justification would separatist efforts by any of the Russian Federated Republic’s 131 nationalities or 31 autonomous republics and regions not also be understandable as decolonizing struggles?

This problem is not only taxonomic. Secession and decolonization are categories often used by politicians to label what they do to prevent or achieve changes in the shape of a state. In the modern era, if an outlying territory is accepted within the core of a state as a commonsensically integral, permanent part of the national domain, efforts by inhabitants of the periphery to achieve independence are understood as “secession.” To the extent that this categorization is accepted, both the inhabitants of the core state and the international community of sovereign states tend to accept the prerogatives of state authorities to treat struggles for separation as treasonous. The population of the core state is expected to support efforts to “crush the rebellion,” to prevent the amputation of the national patrimony, without measuring the costs and benefits of doing so. Any outside intervention on behalf of the “secessionist” population’s putative right to “national self-determination” is deemed thoroughly illegitimate. To the extent that the government’s struggle against attempts to achieve territorial disengagement is accepted as necessary to prevent “secession,” drawing resources from the population to support this struggle is not difficult. The struggle may entail heavy sacrifices; it may succeed or fail; but since the objective is defined in such intimate relationship to well-established collective identities, it will not divide the political community in a regime-threatening manner.

Consequently, few movements seeking political independence for a peripheral territory will define the struggle to achieve autonomy from a central state as “secession,” since that implies the right of the dominant core to retain control of the territory in question at any cost. The struggle over the fate of the territory is much more likely cast as a question of “decolonization.” Aside from the negative connotations associated with imperial political formulas and the positive connotations presently asso-

ciated with “anticolonialist” struggles, portraying a relationship between two territories as colonial or imperial implies that the population of the superordinate region ought to decide on its policies in an instrumentalist fashion—by measuring the costs and benefits entailed in keeping the territory against those associated with disengagement from it. For the government of a central state, categorization of a territorial problem as one of “decolonization” implies that eventually a change in the political status of the territory will occur, that disengagement will not unacceptably insult the national honor or cultural identity of the core population, and that the pace of the decolonization process and the mix of costs and benefits associated with alternative paths to separation are legitimate issues for public debate—issues over which “reasonable persons” may differ without being accused of treason. Such debates may be bitter; the costs of eventual disengagement may be light or heavy; but because the categorization of the territorial issue as an instrumental one is widely accepted, typical political processes of bargaining, compromise, and trial-and-error decision making can proceed without serious threat to the integrity of the political order.

But what about cases, such as post-1983 Israel or post-Soviet Russia, when the shape of the central state is itself problematic, that is, when territorial questions arise whose very categorization as either “secession” or “decolonization” is at issue? One would expect such questions to pose particularly intractable and dangerous challenges to democratic institutions, highlighting both the opportunities and constraints that democratic leaders confront when tasks of political education loom as large as requirements for resource mobilization or interest group satisfaction. Comparably challenging methodological and conceptual questions are raised for scholars studying such problems, since decisions about how to pose the questions must be made without prejudging their categorization as one of either “secession” or “decolonization.” Accordingly, the structure of the analysis must be capable of comprehending processes of change in the intellectual premises of political life as well as reactions to and strategic manipulations of the interests, resources, and constraints that crystallize in relationship to those premises.

Consideration of the debate over the course and prospects for Israeli absorption of the West Bank and Gaza Strip brings into sharp focus the limitations of “decolonization” or “secession” as constructs for guiding analysis when the presumptions associated with these terms are themselves the subject of dispute. These presumptions, attached to opposing images of these territories as “integral parts of the state” or as colonial-style possessions, have powerful effects on the assessments, strategies, and actions of those who accept them as definitions of the problems they address.

As strong as these effects may be, however, the presence of annexationists and anti-annexationists on both sides of the argument over the permanence of Israeli rule of the territories, and the way both annexationists and anti-annexationists have changed, and even rechanged, their minds about the “reversibility” of annexation suggest how little confidence they have in the knowledge of the processes they deem so crucial.

As time passes, without stabilizing the relationship between Israel and the territories by eliminating fears, hopes, or expectations of either absorption or disengagement, the hard outlines of the fundamental theoretical/analytical problem emerge with increasing clarity. Amid the welter of events, the changing judgments of observers, and the shifting hopes and fears of various opposing groups of Israelis and Palestinians, what survivable picture can be drawn of the relationship between Israel and the territories? What framework of analysis can be constructed to accumulate insights—not only those produced from analysis of the dynamics of this particular relationship, but also insights that can be distilled by mobilizing the potential for comparability of other, structurally similar, episodes?

In Chapter 2 a conceptual framework for solving this problem is described, based on images of Israel as engaged in what is best understood as a problematical effort at state expansion or state contraction. I argue that by posing the problem as one of the conditions under which preexisting states expand and contract, theories useful for solving the problem can be developed and even tested by studying two other substantially similar but strategically different cases—the relationship between Great Britain and Ireland from the early nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries, and the relationship between France and Algeria from the late 1930s to the 1960s. Subsequent chapters analyze these cases. The results of this comparative analysis are used in the concluding chapters of the book to identify conditions under which Israel could stabilize its relationship to the territories (through disengagement *or* incorporation); to establish particular scenarios as considerably more plausible than others; and to suggest regularities in the experience of any state whose territorial constructedness loses its invisibility.

CHAPTER TWO

Thresholds of State-Building and State Contraction

The heroic model of Israel's socialist-Zionist founders is based on the movement's success in building a state in as much of the Jewish people's ancient homeland as possible. This state-building project was understood as dialectically related to rebuilding the Jewish nation—a relationship expressed in the popular Zionist slogan “to build and to be built by.” Although willing to accept partition in order to consolidate Jewish sovereignty in part of the Land of Israel, David Ben-Gurion and other mainstream Labor Zionist leaders always maintained the superiority of Jewish rights to the whole land—rights that could be exercised whenever circumstances might make it prudent to do so.¹ Combined with the “pioneering” ethos of state- and nation-building, this ideological position made it difficult for most of the Israeli political class to resist the attraction of resuming state-building tasks in those portions of the Land of Israel brought under the jurisdiction of the Jewish state in 1967.

Revisionism, Labor Zionism's historic rival for leadership of the Zionist movement, was founded primarily on its rejection of any sort of territorial compromise. Although Herut's participation in Israeli elections signaled Revisionism's acceptance of democratic competition as a route to power, Begin and his followers never formally accepted the legitimacy of the state's borders. The party's platform emphasized the imperative of Jewish rule over both the western and eastern sections of the Land of Israel.²

For Herut, opportunities for state expansion that appeared as a result of the Six Day War were more than an irresistible temptation. The victory and the emotional climate that followed were seen as a glorious affirmation of national destiny and national spirit. The territories that were “liber-

ated,” according to Herut, should never have been considered anything but core elements of the state. But Herut lacked the ability to express its ideological commitments by establishing settlements in the newly won territories. For all its militance and maximalism, the Revisionist Zionist movement had traditionally emphasized formal/legal declarations, treaties, and international guarantees, albeit backed up by military force, as the key elements in state creation. Revisionists had always disparaged “close settlement on the land” as a state-building technique. Herut’s own settlement movement was extremely weak. In the context of the Zionist movement it was therefore ironic, but historically and politically correct, for Herut-dominated governments to characterize their “fait accompli” policies of settlement and de facto (as opposed to de jure) annexation as “building the Jewish state in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.”

Theoretical Implications of the Debate over “Irreversibility”

Considered analytically rather than in historical, ideological, or polemical terms, attempts to incorporate the territories into Israel (or facilitate Israeli disengagement from them) are interesting for the theories of state-building and state contraction they imply. Protagonists in the debate over irreversibility surveyed in Chapter 1 tried in particular ways to achieve or prevent permanent incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel. They evaluated the success of their efforts and those of their opponents according to certain yardsticks and used their assessments as a basis for self-criticism and for designing more effective means of struggle. By so doing they displayed implicit commitments to theories of how states are built out of culturally heterogeneous, even hostile territories, and how existing states can build themselves into other territories, or, it may better be said, how existing states build such territories into themselves.

Thus the state-building theory implied by Likud government policies emphasized settlement, elaboration of administrative, economic, and social institutions among the settler population, land transfers, and control of (rather than elimination or assimilation of) indigenous inhabitants. If the ambitious plans developed under the auspices of the first and second Likud governments are viewed as hypotheses growing out of that theory, the energetic efforts of Likud governments to implement their plans and the anti-annexationist camp’s struggle to thwart them can all appropriately be viewed as tests of these hypotheses. It follows that the confusion of the debate over the conditions under which Israel’s ties to the territories could be said to be unbreakable reflected a lack of coherence to the theory itself,

including disagreement on how the dependent variable (establishment of one set of borders or another as “permanent”) could be specified.

This chapter elicits from this rich but confused debate a framework for the analysis of change in the shape of a state. The framework is then used throughout the book to compare cases of state expansion and contraction, testing the plausibility of hypotheses about the political dynamics of state re-formation. To this end, the various and changing conclusions of participants in the Israeli debate over *de facto* annexation are not as important as the reasoning used to support these judgments and reject others. Contained in these claims are choices as to what data are deemed relevant to the question and what measurements of those data will permit confident judgments about state-building or state contraction.

Two instructive areas of tension appear in the debate over the putative irreversibility of *de facto* annexation. In the first, discontinuous, nonlinear images of territorial incorporation, or disengagement, are set against linear images of continuous processes. In the second, a substantive distinction appears between two kinds of factors considered decisive in the struggle over the disposition of the territories. One perspective emphasizes leadership abilities, changing constellations of political interests, electoral clout, and the governing coalitions these factors make more or less likely. Another view stresses changing perceptions of the territories in the minds of Israelis—changes attendant on a growing Israeli presence in the territories and increases in and routinization of transactions across the Green Line.

As I argue below, these oppositions are less contradictory than they may appear if the process of state expansion and contraction is properly conceptualized. The initial plausibility of my analytic framework is based on its ability to glean insights available within each of these perspectives and clarify the relationships among them.

State Shaping as a Discontinuous Effect

Phrases such as “irreversible” or “point of no return,” “five minutes to midnight” or “critical point,” and focus on the attainment or prevention of particular settlement goals (e.g., the “hundred thousand” plan for settlers in the West Bank outside of expanded East Jerusalem), suggest a theory of state expansion in which incremental changes could produce relatively sudden and categorical changes in the character of the political relationship between core and periphery. More specifically, this theory of the state-building process holds that the continuous accretion of small changes in the status quo (land transferred to Israeli control, public works projects completed, change in the number and location of settlements and

settlers, or gradual elaboration of Israeli administrative and legal procedures) will at some relatively discrete point trigger a discontinuous change in the character of the relationship between the central state and the peripheral territory.

For my purposes, whether it was argued that a point of no return had been or might be passed in the Israeli-Palestinian case or where it might be located is less interesting than the very imputation of the existence of a "point of no return." By using concepts and images portraying the process of state-building as marked by a sharp discontinuity, Benvenisti and those who echoed his views were proposing a theory envisioning a radical separation between a breakable relationship linking the central state and outlying territory, on one side of a "point of no return," and an unbreakable relationship on the other. To the extent that a truly "irreversible" situation was said to exist on the "other side of midnight," the theory stipulated that beyond this "critical point" only state expansion or (presumably) destruction was possible, not state contraction. But if a somewhat looser meaning is attached to "irreversible," and in Benvenisti's writings there is ample justification for doing so, the passage of the "critical point" can be understood to mean substituting territorial disengagement as "secession" for territorial disengagement as "decolonization."

State Shaping as a Continuous Process

Decolonization is the process of ending a colonial relationship. The picture conveyed by the word "colonial" contains a metropole controlling a possession, separate from the metropole itself, and exploiting that control to its own advantage. Accordingly, decolonization is almost always viewed as resulting from metropolitan calculations, usually belated, that, because of unrest in the colony, changing international circumstances, or shifting interests or economic conditions, the military, political, and/or economic costs of controlling the possession outweigh the perceived benefits.

In the Israeli debate over *de facto* annexation, many of Benvenisti's most articulate critics employed a thoroughly "colonial" model of the continuing occupation. In contrast to a single point of qualitative change, brought about by quantitative increases in various measures of the process of *de facto* annexation, those invoking a colonial model of the relationship portrayed the cost of breaking the ties between Israel and the territories as tracing a continuously rising cost curve. Writing in 1985, Milton Viorst admitted that "disentangling the structure created by seventeen years of occupation will be difficult."³ The question, however, was not whether

transfer of a territory to the rule of a core state, "once done, can be undone. The potential for change obviously exists. The question is, at what price?"⁴

Abba Eban described Israel's rule of the territories in similarly linear, continuous terms. "The longer it goes on, the more adhesive it will become, and the less easy it will be to disentangle ourselves from it."⁵ The implication, however, was that the task of disentangling the relationship would not rise to a point after which the possibility, and not the cost, of doing so would become the dominant question. "Aside from death and the passage of time," said Knesset member Yossi Sarid in 1984, "nothing is irreversible. Certainly not with such thoroughly political matters."⁶ For Viorst, Eban, and Sarid, whatever drastic or qualitative change in the relationship was deemed possible was not envisioned as something that could occur as a function of settlement, road construction, land acquisition, and other techniques of *de facto* annexation. These investments would make it increasingly difficult, increasingly costly, to disengage. But even if the slope of the cost curve could become rather steep, the result would only be a higher price for disengagement, for "decolonization."⁷

Political Mechanisms of State-Building and State Contraction

The second area of tension in the *de facto* annexation debate pertained to the mechanisms envisioned as consolidating Israeli rule of the territories or capable of ending it, whether gradually or abruptly. One mechanism deemed crucial in promoting or reversing processes of incorporation was the changing level of political support within Israel for politicians favoring disengagement.

Benvenisti's most prominent explanation as to why he believed the "critical point" had been passed by 1984 was that the Likud's settlement effort had gathered sufficient momentum to reach its goal of a hundred thousand settlers. The Likud, he said, had "estimated correctly that the decision about the future of the territories would result from domestic political struggles within the state of Israel." Translation of settlement into state-building on the political level would be accomplished at the ballot box by a powerful prosettler constituency. According to Benvenisti, "Knowing that the percentage of the floating vote in Israel is small, the Likud estimates that 100,000 people, representing four or five marginal seats in the Knesset, would be an effective barrier to any political alternative espousing the principle of territorial compromise. The suburban settlers need not hold with Likud ideology; they simply wish to protect their investment and the higher quality of life they will have attained."⁸

The rejection of this argument by Sarid and other Israeli doves never-

theless revealed their acceptance of electoral and coalition-building factors in measuring the difficulty of withdrawal and setting the conditions under which it could be accomplished. After Benvenisti made his prediction of irreversibility in 1984, Sarid asked how he or the Likud could imagine that the settlers could prevent the opening of negotiations over the future of the West Bank? Their votes, according to Sarid, could elect not three, but no more than one deputy to Israel's 120 member Parliament. "Further, since these votes will be divided up among the Likud, Tehiya, Tzomet, the National Religious Party, Orot, and who knows who else, it is clear that this population lacks any political importance." Even if the number of settlers would increase, and even if the electoral power of the annexationist bloc might at some point become well established, that did not mean, according to this view, that the sentiments supporting such a political alignment could not shift or that effective leadership by anti-annexationist politicians could not bring a government power capable of implementing policies that would bring about disengagement.⁹

Again, what is instructive about such an analysis is not the conclusion—that the settlers were not as weighty a factor as Benvenisti thought—but the acceptance of shifting prospects for hawkish versus dovish governments as the appropriate measure for judging the tightness of bonds between Israel and the territories.

Associated with the explosive increase in settlement activity, however, was a change in the nature of the domestic political forces which both supporters and opponents of *de facto* annexation imagined as decisive. Increasingly both sides argued that the crucial obstacle to disengagement would not be the constraints on government policy produced by the pressure of new constituencies within normally operating Israeli political institutions (e.g., marginal increases in the size of the annexationist bloc within the Knesset), but rather the fear that efforts to achieve a territorial compromise would trigger challenges to those institutions, including armed clashes among Jews. In particular, both Gush Emunim settlers and Israeli doves, and both those who believed it would be possible to overcome such challenges to legally constituted authorities and those who did not, traced scenarios in which settlers, right-wing ideologues, frustrated or hawkish generals, and religious fundamentalists would take up arms against the government and precipitate civil war rather than tolerate Israeli "abandonment" of key portions of the national patrimony.

Among those who believed such a crisis would certainly erupt in connection with attempts to reach a territorial compromise was Yehosafat Harkabi. His fundamental argument against settlements and in favor of moving sooner rather than later toward negotiated compromise was his concern that the scope of the inevitable crisis would increase with the size

and density of Israeli settlement of the territories. As time went on, interests in the continuation of Israeli rule of the territories would proliferate and attitudes toward the Arabs would harden. Harkabi stated, "This development will intensify the internal crisis in Israel when it becomes clear that Israel must nonetheless make concessions for the sake of an agreement, even if such conditions are imposed." He argued that skillful leadership could prepare Israeli society for the stresses it would experience and help it overcome whatever violent challenges would erupt. But he was bitter about the scale of the damage that Israel would suffer, predicting the Jewish state would eventually pay an unnecessarily "exorbitant" and "very painful" price for withdrawal.¹⁰

Some doves took a more sanguine view, identifying the particular combination of policies and coalitions that might be able to overcome such extralegal challenges.¹¹ Others, however, doubted whether Israeli democracy could survive a clash with those ready to resist withdrawal at all costs, or whether any government, faced with such a risk, would ever take it.¹² This latter judgment was accepted with satisfaction by Gush Emunim settlers and other hardline advocates of annexation. Indeed this same "hypothesis," that threats of institutional collapse would translate *de facto* annexation into political constraints against state contraction, was endorsed by the Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. This was readily apparent when it issued its October 1985 warning that negotiations toward a territorial compromise would mark any Israeli government that engaged in them as illegitimate and justify "Gaullist"-style resistance to a "Pétainist" regime.¹³

Psychological Mechanisms of State-Building and State Contraction

Apart from the political obstacle to withdrawal which the settlers and their supporters might constitute as a voting bloc, or as the instigators of civil strife, many participants in the debate over *de facto* annexation stressed the overriding importance of psychological factors. The settlements were not crucial, they argued, because of the direct impact they would have on the calculations of politicians or the probability of one sort of coalition government or another. Rather their presence and the networks of relationships linking them to inhabitants of Israel proper were understood to contribute to a transformation in the way Israelis viewed the natural shape of their country. As a result of the success of the West Bank settlement effort, said one deputy minister in the second Likud government, "the political controversy will be completely different. Every Jew who

settles . . . strengthens our ownership of the areas, and increases our sense of belonging to those areas, and their belonging to us.”¹⁴

The basis of this argument is a substantially different kind of (hypothetical) barrier to reversing the process of *de facto* annexation than the shifting calculations of politicians responding to either electoral pressures or threats of regime disruption. The crucial variable here is the inclination, or even ability, of Israelis to view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as territories separate from Israel itself, and therefore potentially (at least) disposable. According to the official “Master Plan for the Development of Samaria and Judea to the Year 2010,” the primary objective of the massive settlement effort it proposed was to transform the image of the territories in the psyche of Israelis.¹⁵ For the authors of this 134 page study, the objective of permanent incorporation of “Judea and Samaria” into the state of Israel was not the issue.¹⁶ What was problematic was how that objective could be achieved. Of primary importance to the planners was the transfer of large numbers of Jews from Israel proper, across the 1949–67 Green Line border, into “Judea and Samaria.” But they judged that the commitment of Israeli Jews to the “pioneering Zionism” exhibited by Gush Emunim settlers, who lived in trailers, on windy hilltops, far from metropolitan comforts, was not sufficient to achieve this goal. Instead the planners suggested the kind of massive program of roadbuilding, housing construction, infrastructural development, and industrial and residential subsidies which the Likud government undertook. According to the plan, offers of higher standards of living than were available within the Green Line, and employment opportunities and transportation networks arranged so as to minimize contacts between new Jewish residents and Arab inhabitants, would pull half a million Jews into the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) by the year 2010.¹⁷

In the study itself there is no attempt to identify a particular point after which political outcomes other than the permanent incorporation of the West Bank into the State of Israel would be ruled out. The planners neither anticipated that a Jewish majority would be created in the West Bank nor considered a Jewish majority necessary to build the area into the state of Israel.¹⁸ To be sure, a hundred thousand settlers in this area was established as an “interim” target for 1986, but neither this target nor any other numerical objective was characterized by the planners as a sufficient condition for the permanent incorporation of the West Bank. In the planners’ view the critical variable was not the relative size but the physical distribution of the Jewish and Arab populations. The plan put highest priority on the establishing Jewish concentrations in salient, highly visible locations, such as along the central mountain ridge where the main north-south highway connects a series of sizable Arab towns and cities. Such reassur-

ingly continuous belts of Jewish settlement would create a “mental barrier,” linking compact blocs of Jewish towns and villages with one another and to Israeli metropolitan areas by a network of highways bypassing Arab population centers.¹⁹

By preempting available land around urban areas, by physically blocking the “ribbon development” of Arab towns and villages, and by organizing economic opportunities for Arabs near but not inside of already existing Arab municipalities, the Israeli government hoped to prevent West Bank Arabs from leaving their widely scattered towns and villages for urban areas or from developing larger, more imposing metropolitan centers. By avoiding Jewish settlement within Arab cities and towns, by keeping Arabs divided, “out of sight” in their rural villages, and more or less separate from Jewish communities and Jewish-used transportation links, Israelis could come more quickly to feel at home in the area and to sense no difference between one side of the Green Line and the other. Under such circumstances the “psychological” integration of the West Bank into Israel, along with its physical integration, could be ensured.²⁰

What was required, in other words, was a presumption among Israeli Jews that Israel’s relationship to the West Bank had ceased to be problematic. To achieve this objective it would not be necessary to legitimize Israeli control of the area in the minds of local Arabs. However, a degree of Arab acquiescence was seen as important for conditions in the territories to be blended into the Israeli routine, so that Israeli Jews would evaluate opportunities to visit, work, or move to the West Bank and Gaza according to the same criteria they would use to plan travel, work, or residence in other parts of “Israel.” Compared to the enormous expenditures proposed as necessary for roads, housing subsidies, land development, and other infrastructural investments for settlers, the planners believed that the necessary level of Arab quiescence was obtainable relatively cheaply, by small but steady increases in Arab standards of living and employment prospects.²¹

Again, for the planners, the ultimate significance of the projects they advocated was the contribution they were likely to make to the cultivation of a habit of thinking among Jewish Israelis that the West Bank and Gaza were part of their state. State expansion was thus seen as a psychological process taking place (mostly and decisively) within the dominant (Jewish) population of the core state (Israel). By depriving the old Green Line of all practical meaning, and by habituating Israelis to a country in which territories acquired in 1967 were no less accessible or attractive, no more dangerous or alien, than territories acquired in 1948, Israelis would lose not only the inclination but the ability to distinguish “Israel” from the “occupied territories.” No formal declaration of “annexation” would be

necessary. The decisive fact would be that political programs suggesting that Israel's interests could be served by making territorial concessions in the West Bank or Gaza Strip would become more than unpopular; they would appear silly or even nonsensical. By thus removing the disposition of the territories from the national political agenda, the stable and permanent expansion of the state would be accomplished.

The emphasis in this plan on the psychological aspects of the process of expanding the territorial ambit of the state of Israel was consistent with conclusions drawn by many settler activists after Gush Emunim's failure to stop Israel's withdrawal from Yamit.²² An important strain in the thinking of Gush activists, reinforced by the Yamit evacuation and Israel's return of Sinai to Egyptian control, was that incorporation of the territories into Israel would occur only if settlement were part of a broad process of acculturation—an educational, cultural, and psychological process that would bring Israeli Jews to see the State of Israel as naturally and necessarily coextensive with the whole Land of Israel.

"Settlements are not enough!" was a slogan that emerged from a Gush Emunim symposium convened immediately after the evacuation of Yamit.²³ Nekuda editorials and the comments and essays of numerous Gush activists stressed the decisive importance of sustained educational and cultural activities to reshape basic Israeli attitudes toward the shape of the Land of Israel and the significance of Jewish rule over it. What was necessary was to erase the Green Line from the public imagination. Toward this end, the first thing Rabbi Yisrael Ariel recommended was "to burn the old maps, and put before the youth the map of the Land of Israel as written in the Bible Every child must see before him all of the Land of Israel, from the river of Egypt to the Euphrates."²⁴ The public must be educated not only to know but to feel—to feel, wrote one prominent Gush leader, that "if those who raise a hand against a soldier must receive one month in prison, two months, or half a year, whoever uproots settlements deserves life imprisonment."²⁵

While the spectacular success of the "suburban" settlement campaign began by the Likud in 1983 encouraged many settlers again to de-emphasize the educational dimension of their project, still, in January 1984, a Nekuda editorial noted that settlement was only one component of the state-expanding process.

The central goal of settlement—aside from the basic establishment of settlements—is to bring about the complete organization—psychological and concrete—with the State of Israel. Integration can be achieved in several ways, the first of them, of course, would be the extension, and rapidly, of Israeli law on the territories of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. But that is not enough.

*In order that the public will have a psychological sense that indeed Judea, Samaria, and Gaza are integral parts of the state, these areas must cease to be problematic.*²⁶

In the long run, argued Yoel Ben-Nun, that would require a veritable cultural revolution. Settlement of the territories was the practical basis for the eventual success of the necessary “*kulturkampf*,” but was not itself the sign of success. Only if Israeli Jews could be brought to accept the redemptive mission of the state of Israel, and the central role of Jewish sovereignty over the whole Land of Israel in accomplishing that mission, could Israel’s rule of the territories be stabilized. According to Ben-Nun,

There is no longer the possibility of evading the decisive stage of the process of redemption. Beyond establishing the infrastructure of the ingathering of the exiles, the blossoming of the desolated land and the construction of a strong state, what is now demanded is a clear concept of the state and its relationship to the people and the land, to Judaism, to diaspora Jews, and also to the Arab minority. Thus has the long delayed *kulturkampf* erupted.²⁷

Opponents as well as supporters of de facto annexation shared the view that new cognitive habits, determining what was considered possible or impossible, natural or unnatural, problematic or inevitable, would ultimately be decisive in the struggle over the disposition of the occupied territories. Thus in the early and mid-1980s dovish groups such as Yesh Gvul (There Is a Limit) and Peace Now organized events during which their members used green paint to mark the location of the Green Line. Yochanan Peres, a Tel Aviv University sociologist prominent in the ranks of Ratz, expressed his concern in 1984 that seventeen years after the beginning of the occupation, it was “Greater Israel,” and not Israel of the 1949 armistice lines, which seemed to young voters to be the natural shape of their country:

They grew up in an occupying state. For them the State of Israel is a State of Israel that includes Judea and Samaria. Any change in that situation is a change in what they have felt they belonged to for as long as they can remember. Just as someone who grew up in Israel before the founding of the state would not consider it possible to give Ramle and Jaffa back to the Palestinians, so those whose world-view includes Judea and Samaria as part of Israel cannot grasp any other reality.²⁸

In 1985, however, the dovish journal *Koteret Rashit* published a lead article about the outlook of high-school graduates born in the year of the Six Day War who were about to enter the army. The author was happy to

report that the student he interviewed as representative still considered the fate of the territories an issue to argue about. "At least," commented the author, "from that perspective we have achieved something: there are still arguments going on."²⁹

A Framework for Theory Building

Each approach to measuring the success of *de facto* annexation policies offers insights into different aspects of state expansion and contraction. To integrate them within one framework, discontinuous and continuous processes of institutionalization must be linked to the forms that politics takes at different stages of institutionalization: rule-governed competition within an institutionalized setting; competition over the parameters of the institution itself; and competition over the establishment or elimination of presumptive beliefs which can protect institutions from, or expose them to, fundamental challenges.

As a theoretical baseline, a general notion of institutions is required within which the problem of accounting for the variable boundaries of states can be situated and solved. An institution is a framework for social action which elicits from those who act within it expectations of regularity, continuity, and propriety. Such a framework is institutionalized to the extent that those expectations are reliably reproduced. Institutionalization is a process by which change in the rules of political competition becomes increasingly disruptive and decreasingly likely to be part of the strategic calculus of competitors within the institutional arena.

States are special institutions. They are the institutions which enforce property rights and provide sufficient order to permit persons within their purview to build and maintain other institutions.³⁰ In the building of states, as in the building of any institution, the process by which positively valued and stable expectations are produced or destroyed includes both continuous and discontinuous elements and both political and psychological aspects. These facets of institutionalization and de-institutionalization processes can be located in relation to one another if the continuous aspects of institution-building, including gradually increasing propensities to expect norms, rules, and boundaries to be adhered to and symbols to be honored, are understood to surround two distinct thresholds. These thresholds mark discontinuities in the process of institutionalization, dividing it into three stages. Movement from one stage to another entails a shift in the order of magnitude of political conflict that would surround efforts to change a particular institution along a salient dimension (see Fig. 2).

The morphological variability of all states indicates the need for a dy-

dynamic conception of the size and shape of the state. The long time periods through which such shifts manifest themselves, and the suddenness or “lumpiness” of those transformations, suggest the need to temper awareness of fluidity with expectations that change in the contours of states will not respond smoothly to marginal changes in patterns of popular loyalty, economic interest, elite ideology, or even military strength. What, then, endows the nominal border of a state with long-term political significance? Study of the dynamics of state expansion and contraction requires a fairly precise answer to this question—one that combines the notion of ultimate fluidity with the expectation of sluggishness and discontinuity in patterns of border change.

According to one formulation offered by Max Weber, the sociological meaning of a state is the observer-determined probability that individual action is grounded in the expectation that an authoritative framework for political competition exists. “If there is no such probability the State does not exist any more.”³¹ This fundamentally psychological character of statehood is also captured in Joseph Strayer’s dictum that “A state exists chiefly in the hearts and minds of its people; if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise will bring it to life.”³² From a political perspective these formulations suggest that borders of states describe boundaries between political arenas within which it is believed that available power resources will be mobilized according to different sets of norms and legal arrangements. Accordingly, from the internal perspective of any state, stable borders are reflections of presumptive beliefs which remove potentially intractable questions of the composition of the political community from the political arena. The usefulness of these formulations is that they remind us of the constructedness of states and the contingency of their compass, while also suggesting the potential for stability in their size and shape which can attend deeply embedded, widely shared, and uncontested beliefs.

Considering state boundaries as institutionalized features of states also suggests why internal political struggles over the proper and permanent territorial definition of the state are typically so intense when they do erupt. What is likely at stake is not only the instrumental value of the territorial adjustment to the state as a whole. Territorial expansion or contraction can be expected to trigger shifts in the distribution of power within a state by changing the resources available to different groups and, ultimately, by changing prevailing norms and legal arrangements to correspond with the interests of newly dominant groups. Substantial change in the shape and size of a state thus has long-term implications for the relative power position of different groups within it. Accordingly, unless the border of the state is accepted as an immutable given, we can expect that different groups within the state will align their own perceptions of

the proper border in light of the implications different borders, or different principles of inclusion and exclusion, may have for their chances to achieve and/or maintain political power.³³

My two-threshold model of institutionalization, applied to the expansion and contraction of states, is designed to facilitate cross-cultural and diachronic comparison of reciprocal relations between change in the institutional context of political competition and the competition itself. A concrete illustration of the need for such an approach was inadvertently but conveniently presented by Andrew Mack. In 1975 he argued that small nations can win wars against large states because (in colonial or neocolonial situations) the definition of the stakes of the game is "asymmetric": absolutist and total within the small nation, but instrumentalist and partial within the large state. He thus sought, for example, to explain the success of the Vietnamese against the United States, and the failure of the Palestinians against the Israelis. In the former case the political will of the large state could be affected by the high cost of the continued war, while in Israel rising costs were deemed incapable of affecting the state's willingness to commit resources to the struggle. Mack ignored the possibility that shifts within Israel or among Palestinians could transform the struggle against Israel's existence into one focused on establishing a separate state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 (an outcome substantial numbers of Israelis might be prepared to consider acceptable). The fact is that within Mack's static and strictly dichotomous typology of territorial relationships, the possibility that the problem might "move" from one category to another cannot be entertained. Thus Mack is encouraged if not required to ignore crucial and empirically open questions about whether the definition of the problem, among both Palestinians and Israelis, might change, how such changes might come about, and what they might imply.

The absence of any way to interpret changes in the perceptions or objectives of the protagonists as factors that might help transform the character of the struggle between them is also reflected in Mack's characterization of the French-Algerian conflict. Focusing only on the Algerian War of the 1950s and early 1960s instead of the much longer relationship between France and Algeria, he notices French rationality in responding to the rising political costs of holding Algeria, while ignoring the more decisive question of how France came to define the Algerian problem as one of decolonization instead of separatism or secession. Mack thus ignores the crucial failure of earlier French attempts to foster non-instrumentalist conceptions of France's relationship to Algeria. By labeling the Algerian problem "throughout" as "asymmetric," he exposes the inability of his model to entertain change in the categorization of particular relationships.³⁴

Mack's view of Algeria's status—independent and separate from “France”—as a given of the relationship between them, reflects as much the biases of studies of the state cited in Chapter 1 as it does the bias of hindsight in this particular case. Yet it is relatively easy, at least for institutionalist theories of the state, to accommodate variability in its size and shape. In large measure only habit has led theorists such as Stephen Krasner and Theda Skocpol to take the territorial composition of a state as a given—as a structural feature of political life which sets, once and for all, certain limits on the population, the resources, and the myths that could become politically significant. The fact is that their approaches to the study of states as institutions emphasize the need to treat the norms and expectations from which states are constituted as ultimately subordinate to the outcome of political processes. There is no good reason why geographical boundaries should not be treated in just this way—as a problematically institutionalized dimension of the state, affecting but also subject to both continuous and discontinuous processes of political competition.

For example, Krasner views the “symbols embodied in the state and representing basic political and ethical sentiments [permeating] the polity,” as “a fundamental institutional constraint that channels the behavior of individuals even to the point of endangering or sacrificing their lives.”³⁵ The debate in Israel over the territories illustrates that borders, that is the territorial dimension of the state, constitute just such an institutional constraint—one that is neither permanent nor given but which shapes political outcomes in fundamental ways. In general, analysis of how struggles over the inclusion or exclusion of substantial territories are linked to institutional consequences (both intended and unintended) for future competition within the new boundaries is perfectly consistent with the “Tocquevillian” approach to the study of the state advocated by both Krasner and Skocpol.³⁶ This approach gives “crises” in the life of states particular importance. During such episodes of rapid and fundamental change in state institutions, according to Krasner, politics “becomes a struggle over the basic rules of the game rather than allocation within a given set of rules.”³⁷ Such crises may be seen as responses to pressures accumulating slowly over time by institutions which cannot “respond in any rapid and fluid way to alterations in the domestic or international environment.”³⁸ Such dramatic kinds of change have systematic and long-term consequences for the organization of political competition. These consequences include institutional shifts that create new political realities unanticipated by the protagonists during crisis itself. Since, again in Krasner's words, “the interests and political resources of actors are a function of existing institutions,” institution-transforming episodes are “watersheds” separating

periods during which different sets of institutional arrangements and institutional constraints “seem to be part of the basic nature of things.”³⁹


My point here is that borders are institutional constraints, subject to change in time of crisis, which advantage certain groups and rival elites within the state at the expense of others. Substantial changes in the territorial shape of a state represent institution-transforming episodes. Struggles over the size and shape of the state must accordingly be understood as struggles over the “rules of the game.” Boundaries specify who and what are potential participants or objects of the political game and who and what are not. Different borders have different demographic implications and different political myths associated with them. The territorial shape of a state thus helps determine what interests are legitimate, what resources are mobilizable, what questions are open for debate, what ideological formulas will be relevant, what cleavages could become significant, and what political allies might be available.

A Two-Threshold Model of State Expansion and Contraction

The process of territorial state-building, or the expansion of an existing state to include additional territory, can be portrayed as a process of change in the kind of political conflict within the core state which would attend efforts to *disengage* from the new territory. More precisely, the scale of the internal political dislocation which the political class within the core state expects to be associated with efforts to disengage from an outlying territory measures the extent to which that territory has been built, or integrated, into the central state. State contraction involves reducing the scale of the internal political dislocation which would be associated with disengagement, while state expansion involves increasing it. The “regime” and “ideological hegemony” thresholds divide political conflicts pertaining to the territorial shape of the state into three types or stages, linked to one another in Guttman-scale fashion. These stages correspond to struggles over incumbency; over incumbency and regime integrity; and over incumbency, regime integrity, and ideological hegemony (see Fig. 2).

Conflict at the incumbency stage may be thought of as normal political competition conducted as an iterated game according to established and expectedly stable rules. Such “incumbent-level” conflict over a government policy designed to achieve disengagement from a closely held territory might be intense. Indeed the political future of incumbents and their rivals may be at stake in any effort to move toward disengagement. But if competition is limited to political bargaining, threats to bolt from the ruling

Figure 2. Territorial state-building and state contraction



coalition, electoral campaigns, and so forth, it is easily contained within the political institutions of a developed polity. In such conflicts the rules of the allocative game are not the issue. Neither the integrity of the regime nor the underlying balance of power enshrined by state institutions is threatened. The scale and content of struggles over separation of the territory from the state would challenge neither the structure of state institutions nor the underlying beliefs and identities of the state's population. Precisely for this reason such conflict can be interpreted to mean that integration of the peripheral territory into the state-building core is in its early stage.

The territory can be considered much more closely integrated into the core state if proposals for disengagement from the territory raise in the minds of competitors for political power not only the danger of losing coalition partners, partisan advantages, or career opportunities, but also the real possibility of violent opposition and the mounting of extralegal challenges to the authority of state institutions. Conflict at the regime stage, in other words, portends or includes "illegal" competition over the rules themselves in a game treated at least in part as an "end of the world" contestation. Following Antonio Gramsci, I analyze these struggles (in Part III of this volume) as "wars of maneuver." By struggling not just over the fate of the no-longer-so-peripheral territory but over the right of the state to determine it, the protagonists bear witness to the territory's drastically different status. Clearly, state-building has proceeded much further if conflict over disengagement is conducted about the "rules of the game," that is, about state institutions, and not within them. At this "regime" stage of political struggle over the inclusion or exclusion of the territory, the issue is not only "Should the state, for its own interests or the interests of those it is deemed to represent, disengage from the territory?" It is also

“Should the future of the territory as a part of the state be legitimately entertained as a question of interests, costs, and benefits, by government officials or by participants in the wider struggle for power in and over the state?”

The concept of “threshold” suggests a ratcheting effect that might be the consequence of incremental state-building efforts—an effect that may be reversible, but not by purely incremental “state-contracting” efforts. There are three reasons why an asymmetrically discontinuous notion, such as threshold, is needed to label the transformation of a territorial question from a cost-benefit, allocative policy problem (at the incumbency stage) to a struggle (at the regime stage) that puts the legal structure of the state in doubt. First, not merely a quantitative, but a qualitative change in the character of political competition is indicated. Second, the political dynamics of such critical junctures and the crises or periods of rapid change associated with them deserve analysis in their own right. Third, reversing the process, by returning to incumbency struggles even after the regime has been put at risk by the territorial issue, can be expected to be peculiarly difficult, but not impossible.

The need to think in terms of *two* thresholds dividing the process of territorial state-building into three kinds of political situations is apparent if the idea of the shape of the state as one of its key institutional features is kept clearly in mind. The fundamental characteristic of institutions is that they establish certain parameters of political competition as not only difficult to change, but as “givens” that permit decision-making, bargaining, and other forms of political activity to proceed “normally.” By effectively ruling out many of the most basic questions that could otherwise be raised in any political context, well-developed institutions permit political actors to focus on particular issues, calculate the consequences of different outcomes, and make appropriate trade-offs. The establishment of a belief as commonsensically, necessarily true privileges it—by protecting it from reevaluation in the face of events or pressures that might otherwise affect it, and by diverting political responses to strains associated with the state of affairs it describes. This agenda-shaping effect of deep-seated, unquestioned beliefs represents a qualitatively different kind of protection against de-institutionalization than the incumbency or regime-level concerns of political actors.

The way embedded beliefs shape outcomes by excluding certain questions from appearing before the public as relevant, or even meaningful, is what Gramsci emphasized in his study of how hegemonic beliefs, that is, maximally institutionalized norms, set limits to the rational pursuit of self-interest. Conflict surrounding transitions across the ideological hegemony threshold concerns the establishment or disestablishment of presumptive

expectations about rules for political competition, that is, about the character of the background knowledge used by those who play by or enforce iterated games. Again following Gramsci, these struggles are analyzed (in Part II of this study) as “wars of position.” When maximally institutionalized, the territorial expanse of the state—its border—is the boundary of the institution (the state), which people within it expect/presume to be a permanent, proper, and unquestioned features of their public life. A particular territory incorporated into a core state is fully “institutionalized” only when its status as an integral part of the state, not as a problematically occupied asset, becomes part of the natural order of things for the overwhelming majority of the population whose political behavior is relevant to outcomes in the state. Operationally, the territorial expanse, or shape, of a state has been institutionalized on a hegemonic basis when its boundaries are not treated by competing political elites within it as if those boundaries might be subject to change. If typical political discussions imply that such change might be advisable or possible, and certainly if debate rages over whether a particular area and its population are or are not to be considered integral parts of the state, the state-building process with respect to that boundary and territory is plainly incomplete.⁴⁰

In other words, surrounding the second threshold (ideological hegemony) is a second kind of discontinuous change in the process of territorial state-building or state contraction. The ideological hegemony threshold divides political struggles over the authority of the state to determine the fate of the territory (regime stage), from a political context within which no serious contender for political power finds it advisable to refer to the area as if its permanent incorporation as a part of the state had not been decided. At this ideologically hegemonic stage of state-building, its least reversible stage, advocacy of “disengagement” would be expected to produce not vigorous intrainstitutional competition, or polarized and possibly violent political struggle, but a discourse marked by all but universal rejection of the idea as impossible, unimaginable, absolutely unacceptable, and certainly irrelevant. Real movement toward “disengagement” or “state contraction” (now more appropriately labeled “secession”) would, at this stage, require raising fundamental questions about the community’s sense of itself and its rightful political domain. The political unpalatability of raising such necessarily iconoclastic questions and the difficulty of waging a successful political struggle within or against state institutions by doing so are what, ultimately, defend the integrity of the new and larger state. The absence of struggle about the shape of the state is, accordingly, what indicates its successful institutionalization.⁴¹

In sum, we may think of two different thresholds that must be crossed by a state if an outlying territory is to be incorporated on as permanent

a basis as possible. The first—the “regime threshold”—is the point at which a government interested in relinquishing the area finds itself more worried about civic upheavals, violent disorders, and challenges to the legitimate authority of governmental institutions than with possible defections from the governing coalition or party. The second—the ideological hegemony threshold—signals a deeper kind of institutionalization, though it still does not represent an intrinsically irreversible state of affairs. This stage begins when the absorption of the territory ceases to be problematic for the overwhelming majority of citizens of the central state, that is when hegemonic beliefs prevent the question of the future of the territory from occupying a place on the national political agenda. The presence of such beliefs is revealed when, in public, ambitious politicians systematically avoid questioning, even by implication, the permanence of the integration of the territory.

Much of the confusion attending the debate over Meron Benvenisti’s “irreversibility thesis” was due to a failure to disaggregate the process of territorial expansion. Benvenisti was clearly correct in his sense that in the early 1980s some drastic change was occurring in the status of the relationship between Israel and the West Bank. He was wrong, however, insofar as he suggested either that this transformation was irreversible or that it could be identified as occurring at one singular point. Many of his severest critics, such as Abba Eban, were right in their basic point—that in politics virtually nothing is truly irreversible. They were also correct in their overall view that as the state-building, territorial incorporation process proceeded, the costs (to the center) of eventual disengagement would continue to rise. They were wrong, however, to suggest that disengagement was inevitable, and to deny the distinctive contribution that routine processes and habits, such as those emphasized in the Tzaban plan (see note 15, above) and in Benvenisti’s analysis of “suburban” settlers, could make to the possible success of *de facto* annexation. They were also mistaken to have focused so strongly on the notion of continuously rising, but always payable, costs for withdrawal as to ignore or belittle changes in the order of magnitude of those costs.

The framework of state-building and state contraction presented in this chapter has been designed to highlight the reality of discontinuities in the rising cost curve associated with state-building in a target territory, while disaggregating notions of “irreversibility” or “point of no return” into two different kinds of thresholds. State-building, or expansion, is thus conceived of as a process of accumulating more kinds of disruption in the center that would be associated with disengagement. Threats to the regime of the core state emerge, accompanying and even overshadowing incumbency concerns. Subsequently the larger conception of the state may be-

come part of the common sense of political life, a hegemonic level of institutionalization attained as politicians who might otherwise have reason to oppose permanent incorporation of the target territory adopt vocabularies and rhetorical strategies which imply presumptions of its inclusion within the state. State contraction, accordingly, is conceived as a process of moving “backward” through these thresholds, first by legitimizing public discussion of disengagement as a credible or sensible option, and then by eliminating from public debate and private calculation the threat of challenges to the legal order should a coalition favoring disengagement be in a position legally to implement its preferences.

Justification and Design of a Structured, Focused Comparison

As suggested in the conclusion to Chapter 1 and my discussion of Mack’s argument, another way to analyze qualitative changes in the relationship between a core and a periphery is to consider the differences between those struggles to break the relationship which are understood within the core as “decolonization” versus those struggles for which the categorization itself is the focus of contention versus those understood as “secessionist.” These three kinds of political competition correspond, respectively, to the stages previously labeled “incumbency,” “regime,” and “ideological hegemony.” They may be used to sort the arguments made within the Israeli debate over the reversibility of *de facto* annexation. But crucial questions about what is required and/or sufficient to move a relationship across one or both thresholds, in either the state-building or state contracting direction, cannot be answered by the framework itself or by the Israeli case. What is required is a collection of propositions made plausible by the historical experience of states involved in comparable episodes of expansion and contraction. The episodes I have chosen involve the relationships between Great Britain and Ireland from 1834 to 1922 and between France and Algeria, from 1936 to 1962. These are the best-known historical cases of democratic states faced with major territorial problems located “between” secession and decolonization. Each is treated as displaying the results of a series of struggles to institutionalize (and de-institutionalize) state boundaries—struggles susceptible to classification and comparative diachronic analysis according to the framework outlined above.

By plotting and comparing shifts in the relationship between the core states and the outlying territories, according to the categories and expectations contained in the two-threshold framework, I develop a series of propositions to explain those patterns—propositions that, in the final chap-

ters of the book, help guide analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian case and separate probable from improbable outcomes.

Despite very substantial cultural, geographical, and historical differences, the British-Irish and French-Algerian cases display the similar effects of similarly structured political legacies. The incompleteness with which Ireland and Algeria were integrated into late nineteenth-century Britain and mid-twentieth-century France meant that these core states would eventually be subjected to severe strain.⁴² Indeed, prior to British withdrawal from three-quarters of Ireland in 1922 and French withdrawal from all of Algeria in 1962, the Irish and Algerian questions afflicted both Britain and France with chronic, deeply divisive political controversies over the disposition of territories that legally, historically, and ideologically had been treated as integral parts of the central state. The severity of these problems was manifest in regime threatening crises, climaxing in Britain from 1912 to 1914 and in France from 1957 to 1961.

It is remarkable that despite the intriguing similarities between these two most salient of all territorial issues in British and French political history, and despite the truly enormous amount of scholarship produced concerning them, no systematic comparison of the two cases has ever been written.⁴³ One reason is that any objective effort to study the changing dynamics of these episodes requires what is developed here for the first time—a framework of analysis focusing as much on the categorization process (Are these episodes to be considered examples of “decolonization” or “secession?”) as on the implications of each category.

The basis of the comparison presented in bulk of this book, and its suitability for elaborating and testing a model of state-building and state contraction relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian case, is the opportunity to compare the conditions under which the relationships between Britain and Ireland, and France and Algeria, moved across the thresholds of state-building and state contraction—into and out of circumstances requiring core-state disengagement to be studied as either secession or decolonization. By comparing patterns associated with these movements I develop an explanation of why these two democratic states failed to absorb these territories and how, instead, they managed to disengage from all or most of them. The propositions developed and corroborated in this effort, pertaining to general processes of state expansion and contraction, are then available as a basis for offering plausible interpretations of the Israeli-Palestinian case.

These operations entail learning from the mix of similarities and differences in the three cases.⁴⁴ There are several basic similarities. In each case a parliamentary democracy faced (faces) chronic and extraordinarily stressful decisions as to the ultimate disposition of outlying territories

containing hostile indigenous majorities. In each case the outlying territory(ies) was (are) too close to the "metropole," too extensively settled by nationals of that country, too tightly bound by legal, economic, ideological, and/or security-related ties, for decisions to be taken concerning their separation from Britain, France, or Israel without unprecedented risks of mutiny or civil conflict. In each of these cases settler communities (Protestants in Ireland, Europeans in Algeria, and Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) contributed, or have contributed, to strong commitments by large proportions of the British, French, and Israeli populations to establishing these areas as permanent parts of the national domain.

At the same time substantial portions of the political communities in Britain, France, and Israel came or have come to believe that withdrawal was (is) necessary to avoid catastrophe. In all three cases as well, nationalist sentiment, in Ireland, Algeria, and among the Palestinians, developed to challenge continued rule by the metropolitan country. Prolonged debate among Israelis over whether the PLO should be treated as a gang of terrorists or recognized as a representative *interlocuteur valable* is evocative in tone, content, and polemical elaboration of similar debates in Britain and France over how to combat, whether to recognize, and when to negotiate with the IRA and the FLN. In each case terrorism played (is playing) a key role. Finally, in each case changing pressures and attitudes in the international arena shaped (are shaping) core state policies and the outcomes of repeated struggles within the core state over continued rule of the outlying territory(ies).

Among the most important differences between the two European cases are the much more rapid pace of change in the French-Algerian case, the implementation of a complete French withdrawal from Algeria (1962) but only a partial British withdrawal from Ireland (1922), and the demise of the French Fourth Republic in the face of severe strains engendered by the Algerian debacle, compared to the survival of the British regime despite comparable threats from Ulster Protestants, Unionist politicians, and a mutinous military in the years preceding the outbreak of World War I.

Among the differences between the Israeli-Palestinian versus the British-Irish and French-Algerian cases are some which suggest that disengagement might be less feasible in the Israeli case and stable incorporation more likely. Other differences suggest the contrary. Unlike the Palestinians, neither the Irish nor the Algerians entertained irredentist ambitions with respect to the core territory of the ruling state. Despite the historical importance of Britain's security concerns—that Ireland had been used as a staging area by such continental enemies as Catholic Spain, Napoleonic France, and Wilhelmian Germany—and despite the French army's insistence that neither France nor the West could survive without French Algeria,

there is strong reason to consider that neither Algeria nor Ireland constituted security problems for France and Britain as delicate or as complex as the security implications for Israel of relinquishing the West Bank and Gaza.

On the other hand, the permanence of Israel's hold over the Palestinian areas is not nearly as widely supported within the Israeli political arena as was the integrity of the "Union" in Britain or the principle of *Algérie Française* within the Third and Fourth Republics (1871–1958). Leading Israeli politicians have, ever since 1967, publicly condemned the idea of permanent incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza on ideological, demographic, pragmatic, and even security grounds. Nor, in contrast to Britain and France, has Israel declared these areas (apart from East Jerusalem) to be legally integral and inseparable parts of the state. Moreover, Israel faces and seems likely to continue to face a greater array of international pressures toward disengagement than those which impinged on either Britain or France. These differences suggest that Israel's disengagement from the West Bank and Gaza might be considered less difficult to orchestrate, and more likely to take place, than were British and French withdrawals from southern Ireland and Algeria.

Nor do the obvious geographical differences imply anything determinative about the likelihood of integration or disengagement. While Algeria and Ireland are separated from France and Britain by the Mediterranean and Irish seas, no substantial geographical features divide the West Bank and Gaza Strip from Israel proper. For generations, however, what was striking for British and French politicians about the geographical location of Ireland and Algeria was not that those territories were separated from the mainland by sea water, but that they were so close as to make integration seem necessary, natural, and inevitable. Aside from the obvious constructedness of most claims about geographical "imperatives," there are certain respects in which the small distances involved in the Israeli case may serve as a factor facilitating disengagement. One reason both Ulster Protestants and French Algerians fought with such tenacity to prevent British and French disengagement was that they knew relocation to the "mainland" would entail destruction of their way of life, loss of their jobs, and resettlement in a very different kind of environment. Most West Bank and Gaza settlers, however, although prepared to struggle hard to prevent disengagement, might draw back from certain kinds of confrontation, knowing that relocation would involve a trip of less than an hour to homes, jobs, and neighborhoods only marginally less agreeable, and in some cases more so, than those left behind.

In the final analysis, political change in Britain and France resulted in the reversal of seemingly "irreversible" policies and the surrender of sov-

ereignty over what were widely supposed to have been permanently incorporated territories. In addition to helping construct plausible arguments about the circumstances under which adjustments in Israel's relationship to the West Bank and Gaza might take place, the British and French cases can also help identify elements in the Israeli-Palestinian case which *cannot* be considered decisive in determining the ultimate disposition of the occupied territories. For example, neither enormous infrastructural investments nor a settler community equaling 13 percent of the total Algerian population were sufficient to ensure permanent French rule over Algeria.

For comparative purposes, one unfortunate similarity between the British-Irish and French-Algerian cases is that neither witnessed the successful construction of a hegemonic conception of the state which included Ireland or Algeria.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, drawing on these cases to understand the factors that contributed to the failure of hegemonic projects describing Ireland as "British" and Algeria as "French" does *not* require reaching the conclusion that such efforts cannot, or will not, succeed in the Israeli case. Explanation of the failure of hegemonic construction in the British and French cases will help identify those factors likely to determine the success or failure of efforts to promote images of the "whole Land of Israel" as a hegemonic conception of the Israeli state which would include the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The comparison is organized according to the framework outlined in this chapter, moving from political competition surrounding the ideological hegemony threshold to political competition surrounding the regime threshold. Thus the focus of Part II is on the psychological and cultural aspects of state-building and contraction. Chapters 3 and 4 trace the problematic construction, defense, and ultimate failure of hegemonic projects in Britain (Chap. 3) and France (Chap. 4) which portrayed Ireland and Algeria, respectively, as integral parts of the British and French states. In Chapter 5 the wars of position attending these struggles are analyzed by drawing on Gramsci's seminal discussion of the determinants of such conflicts. This analysis yields propositions which explain patterns displayed in Chapter 3 concerning Britain and Ireland, and in Chapter 4 concerning France and Algeria.

Part III (Chaps. 6, 7, and 8) focuses on the political mechanisms of state expansion and contraction evident in struggles surrounding transitions across the regime threshold, that is those in which threats to seize, challenge, or overthrow regime authority become salient. Chapters 6 and 7 plot changes in the level of institutionalization of British rule over Ireland and French rule of Algeria, focusing on the shifting balance between incumbent and regime-level concerns attached to the possibility of disengagement. Chapter 8 then compares the wars of maneuver fought in these

two cases, identifies four “rescaling mechanisms” as strategies for “de-institutionalizing” state control of the territory across the regime threshold, and advances explanations for how and when this was accomplished in Britain and France.

Part IV applies what is learned about both wars of position and wars of maneuver to evaluate alternative trajectories for the relationship between Israel and the territories and provide guidelines for the analysis of other cases of state expansion, contraction, and collapse.